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At the time of this writing, the populations of several North African and Asian 
countries have just risen up against corrupt and dictatorial regimes. After weeks of 
protesting, the populations of Tunisia and Egypt have successfully ousted their 
dictators. In Libya, however, the dictator decided to respond with violence, causing the 
country to descend into civil war. At the same time, Dutch students are protesting in the 
Hague against proposed educational reforms that would result in higher tuition fees. A 
couple of years earlier, youths from the suburbs of Paris, France took to the streets to 
protest against the disadvantaged societal position of their group. These protests quickly 
turned violent. Weeks later, when the smoke had settled, thousands of cars had been 
burned and damage was estimated to be over 200 million Euros (Landler, 2005). 
The individuals protesting in these examples have several things in common. 
First of all, they are members of groups that feel grieved or disadvantaged. Second, they 
chose to work together with other members of their group in order to change the group’s 
disadvantaged position, a goal they would never be able to achieve as single individuals. 
In the psychological and sociological literatures this phenomenon of rising up as a 
group is known as collective action and is defined as cooperative behavior aimed at 
achieving group goals (Simon et al., 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This form of action 
can be contrasted with individual action, which is behavior aimed at achieving personal 
goals. Because collective action often is the only way to achieve important societal 
goals (such as ousting a dictator), and because collective action can be associated with 
significant societal costs (as illustrated by the Parisian revolt) it is important to 
understand how individuals become motivated to engage in collective action (versus 
individual action) and, once they are committed to the collective goal, to understand 
how they make a choice between different means that can be used to reach this goal.  
In this dissertation, these questions will be addressed using insights gained from 
work on Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997), a theory that distinguishes between 
two types of motivation: one that is gain-oriented (promotion focus) and one that is 
loss-oriented (prevention focus). I will argue and demonstrate (1) that individuals under 
prevention focus - because they tend to act based on the negative aspects of the context - 
are more likely than individuals under promotion focus to respond to group-based 
disadvantage with collective action rather than individual action in most real-world 
societal contexts. Furthermore, I will argue and demonstrate that because individuals 
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under prevention focus experience highly important goals as necessities (compared to as 
desires under promotion focus), they should (2) commit to collective action even when 
the likelihood that it will succeed is low and (3) consider more hostile, aggressive forms 
of collective action as justified means when they place high importance on the goal of 
collective action. By contrast, I will argue and show that adoption of a promotion focus 
should lead individuals to only engage in collective action when the likelihood that 
through this action highly important goals will be achieved is high.  
However, before we turn to Regulatory Focus Theory, introduce the predictions 
and discuss the results, we must first consider the ways in which individuals can 
respond to the disadvantaged position of their social group.  
 
Responding to Collective Disadvantage 
 
Earlier work has identified three dimensions on which responses to collective 
disadvantage can differ: the individual – collective dimension, the active – passive 
dimension, and the hostile – benevolent (also called normative – non-normative) 
dimension (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddamm, 1990). This three-dimensional framework 
describes how members of disadvantaged groups have to make three choices when 
deciding how to respond to the disadvantaged position of their group, and that the 
outcomes of these three decisions determine if, and how they will act. First of all, 
members of disadvantaged groups have to make a choice between taking individual and 
collective action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). 
Individual action is aimed at improving the personal societal position of the individual, 
and can take such forms as pursuing a university degree or asking one’s boss for a raise. 
Collective action, by contrast, is aimed at improving the societal position of the group, 
not just of the individual, and can take such forms as collective protest and union 
membership. Thus, to understand the situations in which members of disadvantaged 
groups decide to take to the streets to engage collective protest, we need to understand 
why they have chosen to attempt to improve the disadvantaged position of their group 
instead of merely striving to improve their personal position (the usually preferred 
strategy, Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).  
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The second dimension, the active – passive dimension, indicates that at some 
point members of low status groups have to decide how much either individual or 
collective status improvement is worth to them. The resultant is their level of 
commitment: the costs they are personally willing to bear in order to further the goal of 
either personal or collective status improvement. Understanding individuals’ level of 
commitment to the collective goal is important as some forms of collective action 
require more commitment than others. For example, signing a petition can be 
considered a relatively low cost, easy form of collective action, and therefore requires 
little commitment. By contrast, going on a hunger strike can be life threatening and can 
therefore be considered a high commitment form of collective action. At more 
intermediate levels of commitment to collective action one might consider volunteering 
(which costs time and effort) to further a collective goal. To understand individual 
engagement in different forms of collective action one thus has to keep in mind the 
different levels of commitment these forms of action require.  
Lastly, responses to group-based disadvantage can vary in the extent to which 
they are hostile or benevolent. There are often individuals or groups (such as dictators 
and advantaged groups) that can be held responsible for the ingroup’s collective 
disadvantage. In this situation, collective action may be directed at harming the interests 
of these individuals or groups, not just at furthering the interests of the ingroup. When 
this is the case, collective action can be considered hostile rather than benevolent. 
Examples of hostile forms of action are violent rioting (such as the events that unfolded 
in the Parisian suburbs in 2005) and civil war.  
In summary, in order to understand why and how members of disadvantaged 
groups decide to engage in collective action we have to understand (1) why they did not 
choose to pursue individual position improvement instead of collective position 
improvement, (2) the extent to which they are willing to bear personal costs in order to 
further the collective goal and (3) the extent to which they are willing, or even 
motivated, to harm the interests of those held responsible for their group’s disadvantage.  
In this dissertation, I will investigate these issues using insights gained from 
Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997), a theory that distinguishes between two 
different types of motivation: promotion focus under which strong motivation is 
experienced as desire, and prevention focus under which strong motivation is 
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experienced as necessity. I will argue and demonstrate that understanding individual 
tendencies towards either promotion focus or prevention focus is critical for 
understanding the situations under which individuals become committed to collective 
action and for understanding the means by which they pursue collective goals.  
In the following section I will first introduce Regulatory Focus Theory. I will 
then explain how activation of the promotion and prevention focus affects (1) members 
of disadvantaged groups’ decision between taking in individual and collective action, 
(2) their level of commitment to collective action, and (3) their choice between taking 
hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. I will argue that in most real-world 
societal contexts members of disadvantaged groups under prevention focus will prefer 
collective action over individual action, whereas adoption of a promotion focus will 
cause them to prefer individual action over collective action. I will then argue that 
because individuals under prevention focus perceive important goals as necessities, to 
the extent they see the goal of collective action as important they (1) should be willing 
to commit to this goal even if the likelihood that it will be reached is low and (2) should 
become willing to use more hostile means in pursuit of this goal. By contrast, I will 
argue that adoption of a promotion focus should lead individuals to only engage in 
collective action when the likelihood that through this action highly important goals will 
be achieved is high.  
 
Regulatory Focus Theory 
 
Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997; 1998) distinguishes two motivational 
systems, promotion focus and prevention focus. Promotion and prevention focus can 
vary in strength momentarily, depending on the requirements of the situation. However, 
they also have a strong chronic component that is formed during early childhood 
(Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001; Keller, 2008). The 
promotion and prevention systems differ in their function, lead to pursuit of different 
types of goals, to the use of different strategies during goal pursuit, as well as to 
different emotional reactions to success and failure of goal pursuit. Furthermore - and 
important for the current dissertation - promotion and prevention focus involve 
qualitatively different ways in which strong motivation is experienced (Shah & Higgins, 
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1997; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). Below, I will discuss each of 
these differences in more detail.  
First of all, the promotion and prevention systems serve fundamentally different 
needs and are consequently associated with different types of goals. The promotion 
system serves the need for growth and accomplishment. Because this need is best served 
by the achievement of goals that have a gain/non-gain structure (i.e. goals for which 
achievement is more positive than non-achievement is negative, ideal goals) activation 
of the promotion focus motivates goal pursuit when there is opportunity for gain, and 
inhibits behavior when no opportunities for gain are present. The prevention system, by 
contrast, serves the individual’s need for safety and security. Because the need for 
safety and security is best served by the achievement of goals with a loss/non-loss 
structure (i.e. goals for which non-achievement is more negative than achievement is 
positive, “ought” goals), activation of prevention focus motivates goal pursuit when 
there is a risk of loss. When loss has been averted, or no risk of loss is experienced, 
activation of the prevention system inhibits behavior.  
Activation of the promotion and prevention systems also differentially affects 
the way in which individuals pursue their goals (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Goal pursuit 
under promotion focus typically involves the use of an eager strategy in which matches 
to desired end states are approached. By contrast, goal pursuit under prevention focus 
typically involves using a cautious strategy in which mismatches to desired end-states 
are avoided. This difference in strategy results in two types of bias. Activation of 
promotion focus gives rise to what is known as “risky” perceptual and behavioral 
biases. These cause individuals to pay more attention to - and act on - the possibility of 
positive outcomes than on the risk of negative outcomes. By contrast, activation of the 
prevention system results in what is known as “conservative” perceptual and behavioral 
biases. These cause individuals to pay more attention to - and act on - the risk of 
negative outcomes than the possibility of positive outcomes. Thus, activation of the 
promotion or the prevention system also affects how individuals pursue goals, not just 
which goals are pursued, and creates attentional and behavioral biases towards the 
positive or the negative, respectively.  
Furthermore, promotion and prevention focus are associated with different 
emotional reactions to success and failure of goal pursuit (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & 
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Strauman, 1987). While under promotion focus, individuals experience cheerfulness 
when they are successful in the pursuit of their goals, and dejection when they fail. By 
contrast, individuals under prevention focus experience feelings of relaxation and 
quiescence when success is experienced during goal-pursuit, and agitation when they 
fail. 
Lastly, there is a difference in the subjective experience of strong motivation 
under promotion and prevention focus. When under promotion focus, outcomes that are 
deemed highly important are viewed with desire. Under prevention focus, by contrast, 
highly important outcomes are seen as necessities (Higgins, 1997; Scholer, Stroessner, 
& Higgins, 2008; Scholer et al., 2010; Shah & Higgins, 1997).  
In the following sections I will explain how the insights gained from Regulatory 
Focus Theory can enrich our understanding of (1) individuals’ choice to pursue 
individual-level or collective-level goals, (2) their level of commitment to collective 
action, and (3) their willingness to engage in hostile forms of collective action. In each 
of these three sections, I will first outline the predictions and then discuss the results of 
the studies that were carried out to test these predictions.  
 
The Choice Between Individual Mobility and Collective Action 
 
As explained earlier, to understand disadvantaged group-members’ motivation 
to engage in collective action, we must first understand how they choose between 
group-level or individual-level goals. Several answers to this question have been offered 
in the social psychological literature (cf. Ellemers & Van Laar, 2011). For example, 
work in the social identity tradition has shown that the extent to which individuals 
identify with their group tends to strengthen their willingness to pursue group-level 
instead of individual-level goals (Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers, Spears, 
& Doosje, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Work on social identity theory has also 
identified the degree to which societal group-boundaries are seen as permeable as a 
primary determinant of the decision between individual and collective action (cf. 
Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990). The term permeability refers to the extent 
to which it is possible for members of disadvantaged groups to improve their status 
individually. Members of disadvantaged groups tend to prefer individual action over 
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collective action when the social system is considered “open” (i.e. as having a high 
degree of permeability) and prefer collective action over individual action when the 
social system is perceived to be closed (i.e. as having a very low degree of permeability) 
(Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 
1993; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Lalonde, & Silverman, 1994; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).  
In most societies, however, group boundaries are not completely open or closed 
but can be considered semi-permeable (Wright, 2001a). That is, although individual 
mobility for members of disadvantaged groups is possible in these societies, it is more 
difficult to achieve for them than for members of advantaged groups. In such semi-
permeable systems - also called token systems - members of disadvantaged groups have 
to choose between taking collective action (to change the system) and individual action 
(to make use of the limited opportunities the system offers). Surprisingly, research has 
shown that even when the social system is almost completely impermeable, members of 
disadvantaged groups still prefer to take individual action over collective action (Boen 
& Vanbeselaere, 1998; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, 
& Dolnik, 2000; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990; Wright & Taylor, 1998; 1999; 
Wright, 1997).  
According to Wright (1997; see also Danaher & Branscombe, 2010; Richard & 
Wright, 2010), this preference for individual mobility is caused by tokenism’s inherent 
ambiguity. Wright notes that token systems can be viewed in two ways. Viewed in a 
positive light, token systems provide opportunities for members of low status groups to 
climb the social ladder. Viewed negatively, however, token systems unfairly advantage 
members of high status groups over members of low status groups. Thus, as Wright has 
noted, the extent to which members of low status groups perceive and respond to the 
positive or the negative aspects of the token system should determine their choice 
between individual and collective action. To understand how members of disadvantaged 
groups decide between taking collective and individual action, then, we need to 
understand how they come to perceive, and act on the positive or on the negative aspects 
of the social system. I propose that individuals’ regulatory focus should play an 
important role in this process. Because the activation of promotion focus has been 
shown to result in a perceptual and behavioral bias towards the positive, individuals 
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under promotion focus should be likely to act on the positive opportunities for 
individual mobility that token systems offer, and therefore prefer individual mobility 
over collective action in such situations. By contrast, because activation of prevention 
focus has been shown to result in a perceptual and behavioral bias towards the negative, 
individuals under prevention focus should be likely to act on the negative, 
discriminatory aspects of the token system, and can hence be expected to prefer 
collective action over individual mobility in such situations.  
The results of the two studies reported in Chapter 2 of this dissertation showed 
support for the prediction that adoption of a promotion focus should lead to more 
engagement in individual action under condition of tokenism than the adoption of a 
prevention focus. In both studies, the status system was manipulated to be either 
impermeable or semi-permeable (tokenism). Study 2.1 showed that individuals under 
chronic promotion focus had stronger preferences for individual action when the social 
system was semi-permeable than when it was impermeable. Individuals under chronic 
prevention focus, by contrast, preferred engaging in collective action over engaging in 
individual action, irrespective of the level of permeability. In Study 2.2 , regulatory 
focus was manipulated and behavioral measures of individual and collective action were 
used. The results of this study showed that individuals under induced promotion focus 
spent more effort on achieving individual mobility and less effort on collective action 
when the system was partially open than when it was closed. Individuals under induced 
prevention focus, by contrast, engaged almost exclusively in collective action, 
irrespective of the level of induced permeability.  
Thus, the results of these two experiments showed that, as predicted, the 
opportunities for individual mobility that are present in token systems cause individuals 
under promotion focus to engage in individual action and abandon collective efforts 
aimed at social change. Adoption of a prevention focus, by contrast, was shown to cause 
individuals to recognize and act on the negative, group-undermining aspects of such 
token systems and to try and change them through collective action. Thus, in societal 
contexts in which ambiguity exists surrounding the appropriateness of individual and 
collective action, adoption of a prevention focus causes individuals to engage in 
collective action, whereas adoption of a promotion focus causes them to seek individual 
mobility.  
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Commitment to Collective Action 
 
As explained earlier, the second point we must take into account to understand 
disadvantaged group-members’ collective action behavior is their commitment to the 
collective goal (i.e. the extent to which they are willing to bear personal costs in order to 
further the collective goal). Goal commitment has long been seen as the result of cost-
benefit analyses (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). That is, individuals are thought to commit to 
goals when they highly value these goals, but then only to the extent that they believe 
these goals can be achieved. This approach has been applied to the study of collective 
action as well. In general, research investigating this possibility has shown that 
members of disadvantaged groups tend to commit to collective action to the extent that 
they place importance on its goal and believe that achievement of this goal through 
collective action is likely (Klandermans, 1984a; 1984b; 1986; Klandermans & Oegema, 
1987; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1998; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2008).  
However, other research has demonstrated that these instrumental considerations 
tend to form rather weak predictors of commitment to collective action, and sometimes 
do not even relate to commitment to collective action at all (Fox-Cardamone, Hinkle & 
Hogue, 2000; Fox & Schofield, 1989; Kelly, 1993; Schofield & Pavelchak, 1989; 
Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004, 2005; Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jorger, 
2003). Thus, members of low status groups may sometimes commit to collective action 
even though they do not believe that important goals are likely to be achieved through 
this action.  
I will argue here that differences in promotion and prevention focus among the 
groups and individuals involved in these actions can explain the relative instability of 
cost-benefit calculations as predictors of commitment to collective action. As explained 
before, individuals can perceive goals they deem highly important in two qualitatively 
distinct ways, depending on whether promotion focus or prevention focus is active. 
More precisely, research has shown that under promotion focus highly important goals 
are regarded with desire, whereas under prevention focus they are regarded as 
necessities (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Scholer, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2008; Scholer, Zou, 
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Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). This means that - assuming they highly value the 
goal of collective action - individuals under promotion focus would regard this goal as a 
desire, whereas individuals under prevention focus would regard it as a necessity. 
Because promotion oriented individuals regard highly important goals with desire, they 
should commit to these goals when there are opportunities for furthering them (Shah & 
Higgins, 1997). By contrast, because prevention oriented individuals regard highly 
important goals as necessities, they should commit to these goals even if the likelihood 
that they can be achieved is low. This analysis has important consequences for 
understanding the situations in which individuals commit to collective action. 
Specifically, it means that individuals under promotion focus should commit to 
collective action when they believe it will lead to highly valuable outcomes. By 
contrast, individuals under prevention focus should commit to collective action when 
they place high importance on its goal (causing them to see the achievement of this goal 
as necessary), even if the likelihood that this goal will be achieved is low.  
The results of the three studies reported in Chapter 3 of this dissertation showed 
support for these predictions. Studies 3.1 through 3.3 demonstrated that adoption of a 
promotion focus, whether chronic or experimentally induced, causes individuals to 
commit to collective action only when the likelihood that through this action important 
collective goals will be achieved is high. Also as predicted, the results of these studies 
showed that individuals under prevention focus commit to collective action when they 
attach high importance to its goal, regardless of the extent to which they believe that 
attainment of this goal was likely.  
Thus, the results of three experimental studies provided support for our 
prediction that prevention oriented individuals, because they see important goals as 
necessities, engage in collective action when they place high importance on its goal, 
even when the likelihood that this action will be successful is low. Furthermore, the 
results provided support for our prediction that promotion oriented individuals, who 
construe important goals as desires, become more instrumental in their decision to 
engage in collective action the more they place importance on its goal, only becoming 
willing to participate when the likelihood of success is high. 
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The Choice Between Hostile and Benevolent Collective Action 
 
As explained earlier, the third point we must take into account to understand 
disadvantaged group-members’ collective action behavior is what determines their 
choice between hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. Specifically, members 
of low status groups must decide to what extent they are willing to harm the interests of 
the ones they hold responsible for their group’s disadvantage. When this willingness is 
high, hostile forms of collective action such as sabotage and terrorism may be seen as 
justified, or even preferred over more benevolent forms of collective action. Previous 
research has shown that both laypeople and experienced activists view these hostile 
forms of collective action as clearly different from the more benevolent ones (Corning 
& Myers, 2002; Lalonde & Cameron, 1994; Lalonde, Stroink, & Aleem, 2002; 
Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Wolfsfeld, Opp, Dietz, & Green, 1994).  
What is it then that convinces members of disadvantaged groups that more 
hostile, aggressive means of action are justified? Although to date there has been little 
research on this topic, the studies that have been carried out suggest that members of 
low status groups only turn to hostile collective action when their group lacks the power 
to improve its position in more benevolent ways, or when it is confronted with 
exceptionally unfair and immoral treatment (Gurr, 1993; Louis et al., 2011; Spears, 
Scheepers, & Van Zomeren, 2011; Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh, & 
Siddiqui, in press; Wright et al., 1990a; 1990b). I will argue here that regulatory focus 
plays an important role in the willingness of members of disadvantaged groups to 
engage in hostile forms of collective action. As explained before, activation of a 
prevention focus leads to the experience of strong motivation as the pursuit of a 
necessity. When pursuing a necessity, it should not matter how a goal is achieved, as 
long as it is achieved. This means that individuals under a prevention focus, when they 
are convinced of the importance of the collective goal, should come to see the 
achievement of this goal as a necessity, causing them to see any means as justified in 
order to reach this necessary goal. Promotion focus, by contrast, should not lead to 
engagement in hostile forms of collective action: As explained before, activation of a 
promotion focus leads to initiation of goal-pursuit when opportunities for goal 
advancement are present, and to inhibition of goal pursuit when no opportunities for 
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goal advancement are present. Hostile forms of collective action typically arise in 
situations in which there is very little opportunity to further the collective goal (i.e., 
when the situation is desperate, Tausch et al., in press). In these situations activation of 
a promotion focus should thus lead to inhibition of the pursuit of the collective goal, 
rather than to engagement in hostile forms of collective action. 
Support for these predictions was obtained in two studies that are reported in 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation. In these studies, the extent to which participants held a 
moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group was measured as an indicator of 
the importance they attached to collective action aimed at redressing their group’s 
disadvantage (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). The results of 
the two studies offered support for the prediction that individuals under prevention 
focus, but not individuals under promotion focus, come to see hostile forms of 
collective action (i.e. vandalism, sabotage) as justified means when they see the goal of 
collective action as highly important.  
Study 4.1 showed that the extent to which participants attached high moral 
importance to the goal of gender equality increased their support for both benevolent 
and hostile forms of collective action, but only among individuals with a strong chronic 
prevention focus. Promotion focus had no effect of the relation between the extent to 
which participants attached moral importance to gender equality and support for both 
types of collective action. The results of Study 4.2 replicated the effects of Study 4.1 
and additionally showed that individuals under prevention focus who attach strong 
moral importance to the goal of collective action come to see the ends as justifying the 
means. More precisely, the results showed that although for individuals under 
prevention focus the extent to which they experienced strong moral objections to hostile 
forms of collective action undermined their support for such forms of collective action, 
this only happened among prevention oriented individuals that did not attach high moral 
importance to gender equality. When they attached high moral importance to the goal of 
gender equality, the strength of prevention oriented participants’ moral objections to 
hostile forms of action had no effect on the support for these forms of action. Neither 
attaching moral importance to the goal of collective action, nor holding moral 
objections to hostile collective action affected support for either benevolent or hostile 
collective action among individuals under promotion focus. 
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Thus, the results of two studies provided support for our prediction that for 
individuals under prevention focus who attach high (moral) importance to the goal of 
collective action, this goal is perceived as a necessity, which causes them to see the ends 
as justifying the means, paving the way for engagement in hostile forms of collective 
action. Promotion focus had no comparable effect, suggesting that adoption of a 
promotion focus, leading to an experience of strong motivation as desire, is not 
associated with engagement in hostile forms of collective action. 
 
Discussion 
 
Together the results of the 7 studies reported in this dissertation point to 
prevention focus as the motivational system that is most conducive to collective action. 
Adoption of a prevention focus causes members of low status groups to work towards 
group status improvement, even if the permeability of the social system permits (token) 
members of their group to enter the high status group. Furthermore, individuals under 
prevention commit to collective action when they place importance on its goal, 
regardless of the likelihood that through this action important social change will be 
achieved. Individuals under promotion focus tend to be more instrumental in their 
responses to group-based disadvantage, only preferring collective action when 
individual action does not seem to provide a viable alternative path to status 
improvement and then only committing to collective action to the extent that it is 
expected to be effective.  
To some, the prevention oriented commitment to collective action in situations 
in which its success seems unlikely might seem futile. However, all social movements 
have to start somewhere, and the individuals working at the roots of these movements 
must do so in spite of realizing that success, if possible at all, is very distant. Indeed, 
adoption of the instrumental mentality that was found to be characteristic of promotion 
focus seems to preclude engagement in collective action under these circumstances. 
Engaging in collective action in circumstances under which the ingroup seems to lack 
the power to change its societal position may be important for another reason as well. In 
this situation, the fact that the ingroup is relatively powerless (for example because of 
oppression by a high status outgroup, or by a dictatorial regime) creates a very 
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compelling reason for engaging in collective action in its own right. The instrumental 
mentality that is characteristic of promotion focus should lead individuals in these 
circumstances to accept their group’s disadvantaged position. In the light of this, the 
finding that individuals under prevention focus come to see hostile forms of collective 
action as justified can be seen as something positive. That is, previous research has 
shown that members of disadvantaged groups only engage in hostile forms of collective 
action when they lack the power to change their position in democratic (Gurr, 1993), 
peaceful (Louis et al., 2011) or normative ways (Tausch et al., 2011). The results of the 
current studies suggest that it would be individuals under prevention focus, not those 
under promotion focus, who would be the ones to stand up to the oppression of their 
group by engaging in hostile forms of collective action in these situations. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
The results of the studies reported in this dissertation have important theoretical 
implications. Specifically, the results show how Regulatory Focus Theory can inform 
predictions made by Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to 
Social Identity Theory, three socio-structural variables impact on individuals’ collective 
action behavior: the legitimacy, the stability, and the permeability of the status system 
(Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, 2001b). Legitimacy refers to the bases 
on which status is distributed. When members of disadvantaged groups see these bases 
as unfair, and thus see the status system as illegitimate, this increases their motivation to 
change this system through collective action. Stability refers to the extent to which the 
status system is open to change. Low levels of societal stability tend to cause members 
of disadvantaged groups to try and achieve social change through collective action. 
Permeability refers to the extent to which it is possible for members of disadvantaged 
groups to raise their status individually. Permeability tends to cause members of 
disadvantaged groups to pursue individual mobility and to abandon collective efforts 
towards social change. 
The resemblance of these socio-structural variables to the independent variables 
that were under investigation in the studies reported here makes it possible to integrate 
our findings with Social Identity Theory. First of all, the results of studies 2.1 and 2.2 
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showed directly how the opportunities for individual mobility that are offered by semi-
permeable status systems cause promotion oriented individuals, not prevention oriented 
individuals, to prefer individual mobility over collective action. Secondly, the stability 
of the status system can be considered an important indicator of the likelihood that 
collective action will succeed that was under investigation in Studies 3.1 through 3.3 
(Wright, 2001b; 2009). In this light, the results of Studies 3.1 to 3.3 suggest that that 
adoption of a promotion focus, but not the adoption of a prevention focus, determines 
the effects of the instability of the status system on the decision to engage in collective 
action. Finally, because individuals’ perceptions of the illegitimacy of the status system 
depend on the extent to which status distribution is seen as breaking moral rules about 
how status should be distributed in society, perceptions of illegitimacy should cause 
individuals to attach moral value to the goal of collective action. This means that 
illegitimacy of the status system should motivate engagement in collective action 
among individuals under prevention focus, not among individuals under promotion 
focus.  
The results of the studies also make it possible to integrate Regulatory Focus 
Theory with the recent Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA, Van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). According to this model, there are three distinct 
motivational pathways that lead members of low status groups to engage in collective 
action: the perceived injustice of the social system, the efficacy of their group, and the 
strength of their identification with the group. The perceived injustice of the social 
system closely resembles Social Identity Theory’s concept of illegitimacy and is 
thought to motivate members of disadvantaged groups to engage in collective action 
through the emotion of group-based anger (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 
2004). The concept of group-efficacy refers to individuals’ belief that their group is able 
to perform the actions needed to achieve social change, thereby complementing SIT’s 
socio-structural variable of instability as an indicator of the likelihood of social change 
(Wright, 2001b; 2009). Finally, like SIT, SIMCA specified the extent to which 
individuals identify with their group as an important predictor of members of 
disadvantaged groups’ willingness to engage in collective action. Since injustice and 
group-efficacy should strongly inform the moral importance and likelihood of social 
change respectively, it is possible to integrate Regulatory Focus Theory into SIMCA. 
General introduction, discussion, and conclusion 
 
 
24 
More precisely, the pathway of perceived injustice should cause individuals to attach 
high moral importance to the goal of collective action and thus motivate engagement in 
collective action among individuals under prevention focus (see also Sassenberg & 
Hansen, 2007). Furthermore, the results of the studies discussed here suggest that the 
motivating effects of group-efficacy should depend on the strength of individuals’ 
promotion focus. At present, it is not yet clear how regulatory focus influences the 
effect of identification on engagement in collective action, and this question thus forms 
an interesting avenue for further research. 
 
Practical Implications 
 
The results of the studies discussed in this dissertation also have important 
practical implications. Specifically, they suggest that in most social circumstances, 
individuals or groups looking to mobilize others into engaging in collective action 
would do well to frame their message in terms fitting, or even eliciting, a prevention 
focus (for example by framing its goal as an “ought”, highlighting the negative 
consequences of failing to achieve social change). The results of the current studies 
suggest that doing so would motivate members of low status groups to (1) prefer 
collective action even when individual mobility provides a seemingly alternative route 
to status improvement, and (2) to commit to collective action even when the likelihood 
that this action will succeed is low. This finding is important because previous research 
has identified societal permeability (i.e. tokenism, Wright et al., 1990) and low 
expectations of success (Hornsey et al., 2006) as important reasons for people to 
abandon collective efforts to achieve social change. 
However, in some exceptional situations, individuals committed to collective 
action and looking to mobilize others to their cause might do well to frame their 
message in terms fitting, or eliciting, a promotion focus. For example, if it suddenly 
becomes apparent to people that, contrary to what was previously believed, social 
change is possible, then taking advantage of the promotion focus might be very 
effective. For example, the people of Egypt took to the streets en masse when events in 
the country of Tunisia made it clear that it was possible to achieve social change 
through collective effort. Framing mobilizing messages in promotion oriented terms (for 
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example by framing its goal as an “ideal”, highlighting the positive consequences of 
achieving social change) could be very effective in such situations. 
 
Avenues for Further Research 
 
Even though the present work connected regulatory focus to a broad array of 
predictors of collective action as well as to different outcome variables related to this 
form of behavior, there are still more ways in which Regulatory Focus Theory can be 
integrated with work on collective action. First of all, the current work has not examined 
the relation between regulatory focus and social identification in the decision to engage 
in collective action. Work on collective action has shown that politicized identification, 
the extent to which individuals identify with a social movement or with its goals, forms 
one of the strongest predictors of engagement in collective action behavior (Bliuc, 
McGarty, Reynolds, & Mutele, 2007; Sturmer et al., 1998; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). 
Future research could investigate the role of promotion and prevention focus in the way 
politicized identification motivates collective action. The results of some recent work 
suggest that specific moral convictions lie at the heart of politicized identities (e.g. a 
moral conviction about gender equality forms the core of feminist identification, Zaal, 
Saab, O’Brien, & Barnett, 2011, but see Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, in press). 
Connecting these findings to the results of Chapter 4, which showed that moral 
considerations motivate collective action through the prevention system, would thus 
suggest that politicized identification motivates collective action through the prevention 
system as well.  
Another interesting possibility for future research lies in further integrating 
Regulatory Focus Theory with work showing that hostile forms of collective action tend 
to arise only when more benevolent forms of action are deemed to be ineffective (Gurr, 
1993; Louis et al., 2011; Tausch et al., in press). In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I show 
that individuals under a prevention focus who see the goal of collective action as a 
necessity come to support the use of hostile forms of collective action. However, 
supporting hostile collective action does not necessarily imply actual participation in 
this form of behavior. Furthermore, activation of the prevention focus has been shown 
to cause individuals to become risk averse (Crowe & Higgins), which could demotivate 
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prevention oriented individuals from engaging in hostile collective action, as this course 
of action arguably carries considerable risk. However, there is evidence that individuals 
under prevention focus are not always risk averse. Specifically, work by Scholer and 
colleagues (2010) has shown that prevention oriented individuals, when pursuing goals 
they deem necessities, are willing to take risks when safe avenues for goal achievement 
are closed. This means that prevention oriented individuals, when they construe the goal 
of collective action as a necessity, should be willing to personally engage in hostile 
(risky) forms of collective action when benevolent (safe) avenues towards social change 
are closed. We are currently in the process of investigating this possibility (Zaal, Van 
Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers & Derks, 2011b). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation discussed the results of a research program that examined the 
effects of promotion and prevention focus on when and how members of disadvantaged 
groups decide to engage in collective action. I argued that to be able to answer these 
questions, we need to understand (1) how members of disadvantaged groups decide 
between striving for individual and collective status improvement, (2) how they come to 
commit to collective action, and (3) how they choose between hostile and benevolent 
forms of collective action. The results of the 7 studies discussed in this dissertation 
show that knowledge of individual promotion and prevention focus is crucial for 
understanding members of low status groups’ collective action behavior. Specifically, 
adoption of a promotion focus was shown to make members of disadvantaged groups 
instrumental in responding to their group’s disadvantage, causing them (1) to prefer 
individual action over collective action when the social system provided opportunities 
for token mobility, and (2) to only commit to collective action when the likelihood that 
this action would be successful was high. Promotion focus was unrelated to support for 
hostile forms of collective action. Adoption of a prevention focus, by contrast was 
shown to (1) cause members of low status groups to choose collective action, even 
when individual mobility provided a different route to status improvement. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the goal of collective action was seen as important, 
adoption of a prevention focus was shown (2) to cause members of disadvantaged 
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groups to commit to collective action, even when the likelihood of social change was 
low, and (3) to come to see hostile forms of collective action as justified means to reach 
the collective goal. In sum, the results of the current dissertation show a strong 
connection between the prevention focus and the decision to engage in different forms 
of collective action. 
 
A note to the reader 
 
The empirical chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 2 to 4) were written as 
separate journal articles in collaboration with Colette van Laar, Tomas Ståhl, Naomi 
Ellemers and Belle Derks. As a result, these chapters have been written in the first-
person plural and may show some overlap in places. Footnotes are included at the end 
of each chapter. 
 
  
  
Chapter 2. 
 
Responding to tokenism:  
How promotion and prevention focus affect 
commitment to collective and individual status 
improvement 1 
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Introduction 
 
Despite strong endorsement of meritocracy beliefs (Ellemers & Van Laar, 2010) 
in reality most societies offer less opportunities for advancement to members of low 
status groups (e.g. women, ethnic minorities) than to members of high status groups 
(Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). In these systems (called token systems) social 
status is distributed partly based on individual merit and partly based on group 
membership (Wright et al., 1990). This mix between meritocracy and discrimination 
implies that token systems are ambiguous, and makes it unclear for members of low 
status groups whether they should try to take advantage of the positive, meritocratic 
aspects of the social system and pursue individual status improvement, or whether they 
should address the negative, discriminatory aspects of the system through group status 
improvement (Wright, 1997). In the current research we investigate how members of 
disadvantaged groups respond to this ambiguity. We contribute to current insights by 
connecting knowledge about tokenism with reasoning derived from Regulatory Focus 
Theory (Higgins, 1997). We argue that because individuals under promotion focus tend 
to act upon the positive aspects of a situation, they should be motivated to exploit the 
advancement opportunities token systems offer and seek individual status improvement. 
We predict prevention-oriented individuals to be more likely to act on the negative - 
discriminatory - aspects of the token system. They should therefore be more inclined to 
pursue collective status improvement. 
In the next section, we will explain how the ambiguity of token systems makes it 
difficult for members of low status groups to decide between pursuing individual or 
group status improvement. We then connect these concerns to insights derived from 
Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997) to explain how this helps predict and 
understand when and why members of low status opt for individual or collective status 
improvement under token conditions. 
 
Responding to Tokenism 
 
In most societies, a person’s social status is not only based on individual merit, 
but also on group membership (cf. Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Wright et al., 1990). 
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As a result, members of low status groups tend to receive fewer opportunities for 
individual status improvement than members of high status groups (Boen & 
Vanbeselaere, 1998; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, & 
Dolnik, 2000; Wright et al., 1990; Wright & Taylor, 1998; 1999). For example, 
discriminatory practices in hiring and promotion have been shown to make it more 
difficult for women and ethnic minorities (compared to men and ethnic majorities) to 
climb the social ladder and raise their status individually (Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia, & 
Vanneman, 2001; Crow, Folk, & Hartman, 1998; Morrison, & White, 1988; Schwarz, 
1971). Social systems in which status improvement opportunities are based both on 
merit and on group membership, are called token systems and can be distinguished from 
fully open systems, in which status distribution is based completely on individual merit, 
as well as closed systems, in which status distribution is completely based on group 
membership (Wright et al., 1990). Thus, although token systems offer some 
opportunities for members of low status groups to achieve higher status individually, 
they still are discriminatory in that they structurally offer more opportunities to 
members of high status groups.  
Token systems thus create ambiguity for members of low status groups 
regarding the most appropriate way to behave, because they encompass positive, 
meritocratic features as well as negative, discriminatory characteristics (Wright, 1997). 
In this way, tokenism creates a dilemma for members of low status groups, as they have 
to decide whether to exploit the opportunities offered by the social system – and exert 
effort to raise their personal standing – or to address the discriminatory aspects of the 
social system - by working towards group status improvement. Our current aim is to 
examine how individuals decide between pursuing individual or group status 
improvement under these conditions. Understanding these types of responses to 
meritocratic status systems is important, not only to predict the strategies specific 
individuals are likely to follow to pursue status improvement, but also because of the 
more profound societal consequences of such responses, which can range from 
acceptance of the social system to rebellion against it. 
To anticipate low status group members’ preferences for individual-level or 
group-level status improvement in token systems we need to understand how they make 
sense of the ambiguity present in such systems (Wright, 1997). This ambiguity allows 
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individuals to view token systems in two ways. Viewed positively, token systems 
provide members of low status groups with opportunities for individual status 
improvement. Viewed negatively however, token systems unfairly disadvantage 
members of low status groups. To be able to predict how members of low status groups 
decide between pursuing individual or collective status improvement under conditions 
of tokenism, one therefore needs to understand how they perceive and respond to the 
positive and negative aspects of this system (Danaher & Branscombe, 2010; Richard & 
Wright, 2010; Wright, 1997).  
In the next section we introduce regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) as a 
novel approach to the psychology of tokenism. We argue that adoption of a promotion 
or a prevention focus is relevant in this sense, as this biases individuals towards acting 
on the positive or the negative aspects of the token system. This in turn should 
determine the choice they make between striving for individual or group status 
improvement.  
 
The Self-regulation of Responding to Tokenism 
 
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) distinguishes between two motivational 
systems that regulate goal-directed behavior: promotion focus and prevention focus. 
Promotion and prevention focus serve different needs and differentially affect the way 
goals are construed and subsequently pursued. Promotion and prevention focus vary in 
strength both chronically across individuals and momentarily across situations (Higgins, 
Friedman, Harlow, Idson, & Ayduk, 2001). Promotion focus functions to serve the need 
for gowth and accomplishment. Under promotion focus, motivation is experienced as 
desire, causing success during goal-pursuit to be seen as more positive than failure is 
seen as negative (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Shah & Higgins, 1997). As 
a consequence, individuals under promotion focus are strategically inclined to approach 
positive outcomes, rather than avoiding negative outcomes (Crowe and Higgins, 1997). 
Prevention focus, by contrast, functions to serve the need for safety and security. Under 
prevention focus, motivation is experienced as necessity, causing failure of goal-pursuit 
to be seen as more negative than success is seen as positive. Consequently, adoption of 
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a prevention focus leads to the strategic inclination to avoid negative outcomes, rather 
than approaching positive outcomes.  
In view of the specific characteristics of these two motivational systems, we 
argue that activation of a promotion or prevention focus should have important 
consequences for the way members of low status groups respond to the ambiguity 
present in token systems and, consequently, for their decision to pursue individual or 
group status improvement. Because promotion-oriented individuals are strategically 
inclined to approach positive outcomes they should primarily base their actions on 
positive aspects of the token system. Likewise, because prevention-oriented individuals 
are strategically inclined to avoid negative outcomes, their actions should mainly 
respond to the negative aspects of this system. This bias towards the use of positive or 
negative cues for action should have especially strong effects in ambiguous situations 
(i.e. weak situations, Snyder & Ickes, 1985) such as tokenism, where the positive 
aspects of the situation motivate a fundamentally different course of action than the 
negative ones. Put differently, when under promotion focus, members of low status 
groups should be particularly sensitive to the positive aspects of the token system (i.e. 
the opportunities for individual mobility it provides) and become willing to engage in 
individual action. When under prevention focus however, members of low status groups 
should base their behavior on the negative aspects of the token situation (i.e. its 
restricted nature), causing them to see collective action as the more appropriate course 
of action. We thus predict that under conditions of tokenism the adoption of a 
promotion focus should lead to more engagement in efforts towards individual status 
improvement and less engagement in efforts towards group status improvement than the 
adoption of a prevention focus. Importantly, when there is no ambiguity about the 
properties of the situation (e.g., in completely closed conditions) there is no reason to 
anticipate that action preferences depend on regulatory focus as there is less room for 
interpretation that would bring to the fore differential sensitivity to specific aspects of 
the situation.  
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Overview of the Present Research 
 
Two studies were conducted to test our prediction that regulatory focus 
determines whether members of low status groups pursue individual or group status 
improvement under conditions of tokenism. A paradigm was used in which participants 
were members of a low status group that engaged in a competition with a higher status 
group. We used different ways to examine our predictions. In Study 2.1, regulatory 
focus was assessed as a chronic individual difference variable, and participant were 
asked to indicate their preferences for individual vs. group status improvement. In Study 
2.2 , regulatory focus was experimentally manipulated and we assessed actual efforts 
towards achieving individual and group status improvement. In both studies the 
permeability of group boundaries was experimentally induced. We contrasted our focal 
condition where token permeability was allowed with a control condition where group 
boundaries were completely closed.  
 
Study 2.1 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Eighty-eight female students from Leiden university (Mage = 21.65, SD = 4.09) 
participated in this study in exchange for €4.50 or course credit. Promotion vs. 
prevention focus was assessed as an individual difference variable before the 
experiment. We manipulated group boundary permeability (closed vs. token) in a 
between-participants design. Participants’ preferences for individual vs. group status 
improvement served as the dependent variable. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they would be taking part in two unrelated studies: a 
short survey and an experiment. The short survey consisted of our pre-measure of 
regulatory focus. We measured participants’ chronic prevention (α = .81) and promotion 
focus (α = .68) using the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, 
Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001) and created a regulatory focus dominance measure by 
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subtracting the standardized prevention scores from the standardized promotion scores. 
High scores on this variable indicate a dominant promotion focus, low scores a 
dominant prevention focus (cf. Sassenberg, Jonas, Shah & Brazy, 2007). 
Participants were then informed that the first study was completed and that the 
second study would now commence. This part of the experiment was introduced as a 
study on competition between groups. To create different groups, all participants were 
(ostensibly at random) assigned to a team of 4 individuals (Team B), and told that they 
were going to compete with another team of 4 (Team A). In reality, no teams were 
formed and all participants worked individually throughout the entire experiment. To 
increase involvement in the competition, participants were informed that the winning 
team would get to take part in a fun and interesting task following the experiment, 
whereas the losing team would have to take part in a more tedious task (Wright et al., 
1990). Participants were then told that the competition would consist of two rounds: a 
preliminary and a final. To allow for the later manipulation of permeability, participants 
were informed that the team that would win the preliminary would get the chance to 
influence the rules of the final. 
At this point the preliminary commenced. This round consisted of an anagram-
task. Participants tried to solve as many five-letter anagrams (e.g. KTAES [SKATE]) as 
possible in 3 minutes. To create a status difference between the teams, all participants 
were then informed that their team had solved slightly less anagrams than the other team 
and that they had thus lost the preliminary (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Ellemers, 
Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993). 
To introduce the manipulation of permeability (cf. Ellemers et al., 1997; Wright 
et al., 1990), participants were told that team A, because it had won the preliminary, 
would now get to decide whether or not to let one member of the participant’s team join 
team A after the final. If team A would allow this, it was explained, then the members 
of the participant’s team would each have to choose between working for their group (to 
win the final as a team) and working individually (to gain entry into team A) during the 
final. If team A would not allow a member of team B to enter their team, participants 
were told, then they would have no other option but to work for their team if they 
wanted to win the competition. Finally, all participants were informed that working for 
themselves during the final would not help their team win the competition, and that 
Responding to tokenism 
 
 
37 
working for their team during the final would not increase their chances of individually 
entering team A.  
At this point the permeability of the status difference between the two groups 
was manipulated. In the closed condition, participants were informed that team A had 
decided not to give the members of Team B the chance to enter team A. In the token 
condition, participants were informed that Team A had decided to let the member of 
Team B with the highest individual score in the finale enter Team A. Participants were 
then asked to answer some questions before the final round of the competition would 
commence. These were the dependent variables. 
 
Measures 
All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 9 (completely agree). 
Manipulation check. The effectiveness of the manipulation of permeability was 
checked with two items (e.g. “It is possible for a member of my team to enter team A”, 
r(88) = .90, p < .001). 
Preference for individual vs. group status improvement was measured with six 
items (e.g. “I intend to solve as many anagrams as possible for myself during the final”, 
“I intend to solve as many anagrams as possible for my team during the final” [reverse 
scored], α = .78). High scores on this variable indicate a preference for individual status 
improvement over group status improvement. Participants were then informed that the 
experiment was finished and the final round of the competition would not take place. 
They were then fully debriefed, thanked and paid. 
 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
As intended, an ANOVA on the manipulation check showed that participants in 
the token condition viewed the intergroup structure as more permeable (M = 7.35, SD = 
1.11) than participants in the closed condition (M = 3.27, SD = 2.56, F[1, 87] = 89.51, p 
< .001, η2 = .51).  
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Preferences for individual vs. group status improvement 
Participants’ preferences for pursuing individual rather than group status 
improvement were analyzed using hierarchical linear regression. In step 1, the effect-
coded manipulation of permeability (-1 for the closed condition, 1 for the token 
condition) and the standardized regulatory focus measure were entered. Their 
interaction term was entered in step 2. The results revealed the predicted interaction 
between the manipulation of permeability and regulatory focus, B = 0.37, SE = 0.12, 
F(1, 84) = 9.78, p = .002, ∆R2 = .09, see Figure 2.1. As expected, simple slope analysis 
(Aiken & West, 1991) showed that, in the token condition, chronic promotion focus 
dominance increased participants’ preferences for pursuing individual status 
improvement over group status improvement, B = 0.52, SE = 0.17, F(1, 84) = 9.27, p = 
.002.,There was no such effect of regulatory focus in the closed condition, B = -0.22, SE 
= 0.16, F(1, 84) = 1.79, p = .18.  
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Figure 2.1. Individual (vs. group) status improvement strategies as a function of chronic 
regulatory focus and permeability (Study 2.1).   
 
Discussion 
 
Study 2.1 offered preliminary evidence for our prediction regarding the effect of 
regulatory focus on the choice between pursuing individual and group status 
improvement in token systems. As predicted, under conditions of token permeability, 
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promotion-oriented individuals preferred to pursue more individual status improvement 
and less group status improvement than individuals under prevention focus. Also as 
predicted, no such effect of regulatory focus was found when the status hierarchy was 
closed. Thus, under conditions of token permeability, the adoption of a promotion focus 
seems to cause members of low status groups to prefer seeking individual status 
improvement over group status improvement. 
This study thus offers initial evidence for our predictions but also has some 
limitations. First, self-declared preferences for pursuing individual vs. group status 
improvement that served as the dependent variable in Study 2.1 do not necessarily 
imply actual engagement in efforts towards individual or group status improvement. 
Second, because regulatory focus was assessed as a chronic individual difference 
variable in this study, alternative explanations for these results (e.g., due to a third 
variable that covaries with chronic promotion vs. prevention orientation) can not be 
ruled out. To be able to draw more unequivocal conclusions, but also with an eye on 
designing interventions, it would be important to know whether or not the situational 
adoption of a focus on promotion vs. prevention actually has a causal effect on 
commitment to individual and group status improvement under token conditions. This is 
why Study 2.2 included a manipulation of regulatory focus and behavioral measures of 
engagement in efforts towards individual and group status improvement.  
 
Study 2.2 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-nine students from Leiden University (51 women, Mage = 20.39, SD = 5.12) 
participated in this study in exchange for €4.50 or course credit. They were randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion or prevention) X 2 
(permeability: closed vs. token) experiment. Engagement in efforts towards individual 
and group status improvement served as the dependent variables. 
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Procedure 
Study 2.2 employed the same procedure as Study 2.1, with the exception of the 
added manipulation of regulatory focus and the behavioral measures of efforts towards 
individual and group status improvement. In the first part, we manipulated regulatory 
focus with an adapted version of the procedure suggested by Higgins and colleagues 
(Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; see also Zaal, Van Laar, Stahl, Ellemers, & 
Derks, in press, a; in press, b). Participants wrote about what they would ideally like to 
achieve (promotion condition) or felt they ought to achieve (prevention condition) in 
their working life. According to Higgins and colleagues (1994) the priming of ideals 
leads individuals to adopt a promotion focus, whereas the priming of oughts causes 
them to adopt a prevention focus. Participants were then informed that the first part of 
the experiment was completed and that the second part of the experiment would 
commence. The procedure of the second part of the experiment was the same as in 
Study 2.1 up to the measurement of the dependent variables. 
 
Measures 
The manipulation check of permeability consisted of the same two items as in 
Study 2.1 (r(59) = .79, p < .001). 
The perceived difficulty of the anagram task was measured as a control variable 
using two items (e.g. “I think the anagram task is very difficult/not difficult at all 
[reverse scored]”, r(59) = .71, p < .001). 
Manipulation check of regulatory focus. The time participants needed to report 
their (promotion- and prevention-related) emotional states was measured to serve as the 
check of the regulatory focus manipulation. According to Shah and Higgins (2001), 
individuals under promotion focus are faster at appraising how cheerful or dejected a 
stimulus makes them feel, whereas individuals under prevention focus are faster at 
appraising how quiescent or agitated a stimulus makes them feel. We thus measured 
participants’ promotion-related (dejection and cheerfulness) and prevention-related 
(agitation and quiescence) emotions using six items and recorded the time they needed 
to indicate their answers. We created a measure of regulatory focus by subtracting the 
mean log-transformed response-times on the promotion emotions items from the mean 
log-transformed response-times on the prevention emotion items. High scores on this 
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variable indicate dominant promotion focus, low scores dominant prevention focus 
(Zaal et al., in press, a). 
In contrast to Study 2.1, Study 2.2 also included the final round of the 
competition. During this round participants had four minutes to solve five-letter 
anagrams. Before attempting to solve each anagram, participants had to decide whether 
they wanted to solve this anagram for their personal benefit (to gain entry into Team A) 
or for the benefit of their team (to win the group competition against Team A). The 
number of anagrams participants solved for their team and for themselves were recorded 
and served as the measures of effort invested in individual and group status 
improvements (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). Finally, all participants 
were debriefed, thanked and paid.  
 
Results 
Analyses 
Both manipulation checks were analyzed with ANOVAs using the 
manipulations of permeability and regulatory focus as independent variables. 
Engagement in effort towards individual and group status improvement were analyzed 
with separate ANCOVAs using the manipulations of permeability and regulatory focus 
as independent variables and the perceived difficulty of the anagram task as a 
covariate.2 Significant interactions were further analyzed with simple effects analyses 
(Aiken & West, 1991). 
 
Manipulation checks 
As intended, the intergroup boundary was seen as more permeable in the token 
condition (M = 7.16, SD =1.60) than in the closed condition (M = 1.77, SD = 1.37, F[1, 
57] = 187.17, p < .001, η2 = .77). No other effects emerged (p’s > .68). Also as 
intended, the results of an ANOVA revealed faster responding on the promotion 
(compared to prevention) emotion items in the promotion condition (M = 0.69, SD = 
1.24) than in the prevention condition (M = -.58, SD = 1.56, F[1, 50] = 4.60, p = .04, η2 
= .08).3 No other effects emerged (p’s > .83). Thus, both manipulations were successful. 
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Effort towards individual status improvement 
The results revealed the predicted interaction between the manipulations of 
regulatory focus and permeability on the number of anagrams participants solved for 
themselves, F(1, 54) = 4.44, p = .04, ηp2 = .08, see Figure 2.2. Analyses showed that in 
the token condition, induction of a promotion focus caused participants to engage in 
more efforts aimed at individual status improvement than induction of a prevention 
focus, B = 2.64, SE = 0.85, F(1, 54) = 9.72, p = .003. No effect of regulatory focus on 
engagement in effort towards individual status improvement was found in the closed 
condition, B = 0.16, SE = 0.81, F(1, 54) < 1, p = .84.  
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Figure 2.2. Effort towards individual status improvement as a function of the 
manipulations of permeability and regulatory focus (Study 2.2). 
 
Effort towards group status improvement 
The results revealed the predicted interaction between the manipulations of 
permeability and regulatory focus on the number of anagrams participants solved for 
their team, F(1, 54) = 4.78, p = .03, ηp2 = .08, see Figure 2.3. Analyses showed that in 
the token condition induction of a prevention focus caused participants to spend more 
effort on group status improvement than induction of a promotion focus, B = -4.44, SE 
= 1.19, F(1, 54) = 13.87, p < .001. No effect of regulatory focus on engagement in effort 
towards group status improvement was found in the closed condition, B = -0.82, SE = 
1.14, F(1, 54) < 1, p = .47.  
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Discussion 
Study 2.2 replicated the results of Study 2.1 and extended them by employing a 
manipulation (instead of a measure) of regulatory focus and by using behavioral 
measures of efforts towards individual and group status improvement. The results 
provided further evidence for the prediction that adoption of a promotion focus leads 
members of low status groups to pursue individual status improvement instead of group 
status improvement under conditions of tokenism. The adoption of a prevention focus, 
by contrast, was shown to cause individuals to commit to group status improvement, 
even when there were opportunities for individual status improvement as implied in the 
token system.  
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Figure 2.3. Effort towards group status improvement as a function of the manipulations 
of permeability and regulatory focus (Study 2.2).  
 
General Discussion 
 
The current research was designed to investigate the role of regulatory focus in 
the choice between pursuing individual and group status improvement. Connecting 
existing insights on token systems with a self-regulation perspective allowed us to 
provide important new insights into how members of low status groups respond to token 
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systems in which access to the benefits associated with high social status is restricted. 
According to earlier work (Danaher & Branscombe, 2010; Wright, 1997), token systems 
are ambiguous and individuals’ choices between pursuing personal or group status 
improvement in these situations depend on whether they recognize, and act on, the 
positive aspects or the negative aspects of this ambiguous system. Acting on the 
positive aspects of the token system, such as the fact that it offers low status group 
members some opportunities for individual status improvement, leads to the pursuit of 
individual mobility as a status enhancement strategy. By contrast, acting on the 
negative, discriminatory aspects of token systems leads to the adoption of collective 
action as a status enhancement strategy. In the current research, we proposed that 
promotion and prevention focus represent important mechanisms through which 
members of low status groups make sense of tokenism’s ambiguity. We argued that, 
compared to those under prevention focus, individuals under promotion focus should be 
more inclined to base their actions on the positive aspects of the token system and hence 
should be more likely to engage in efforts towards individual status improvement while 
they tend to commit less effort towards group status improvement in such token 
systems. Conversely, we argued that individuals under prevention focus should be more 
likely than individuals under promotion focus to act on the negative aspects of the 
system and, consequently, to pursue group status improvement.  
To investigate this prediction we used a paradigm in which participants were 
assigned to an experimentally created low status group that engaged in a competition 
with a high status outgroup. In Study 2.1 we assessed chronic individual differences in 
promotion and prevention focus prior to the experiment, manipulated the permeability 
(closed vs. token) of the high status group’s boundary and measured preferences for 
individual vs. group status improvement as a dependent variable. In Study 2.2, we 
manipulated regulatory focus as well as the possibility of entering the high status 
outgroup, and measured actual engagement in efforts directed towards individual and 
group status improvement. Importantly, because of the experimental nature of the 
studies and the behavioral nature of the dependent variables employed, we can draw 
firm causal conclusions about actual engagement in efforts towards individual and 
group status improvement. 
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As predicted, under conditions of tokenism participants spent more effort on 
pursuing individual status improvement and less effort on pursuing group status 
improvement when promotion focus was chronically dominant (Study 2.1) or 
experimentally induced (Study 2.2) than when prevention focus was chronically 
dominant or experimentally induced. No such differences between individuals with a 
promotion vs. prevention focus were found when the situation was unambiguous – 
because the boundary of the high status group was closed.  
These results have clear implications for both the theory and practice of 
collective action. First of all, the current research shows that the adoption of a 
prevention focus can ensure commitment to collective action even in situations in which 
an individual mobility strategy also appears a seemingly viable alternative strategy 
towards status improvement. This finding adds to other work that links prevention focus 
to collective action. More precisely, this work has shown that adoption of a prevention 
focus (compared to adoption of a promotion focus) makes individuals willing to engage 
in collective action even when the chances of this action leading to the desired outcome 
are low (Zaal et al., in press, a). Furthermore, this prior research has shown that 
prevention-oriented individuals committed to collective action also become willing to 
engage in more hostile forms of action (Zaal et al., in press, b). Thus, by showing that 
activation of the prevention focus causes individuals to commit to group status 
improvement, even when opportunities for individual status improvement exist, the 
results of the current work complement existing work linking the prevention focus to 
engagement in collective action. 
The current data also have important implications for the practice of collective 
action. More specifically, they suggest that individuals interested in mobilizing others to 
the cause of group status improvement in token systems would do well to frame their 
messages in prevention-oriented terms (e.g. by presenting their goals as oughts rather 
than ideals). This should lead the targets of such messages to adopt a prevention focus, 
making it less likely that they will be seduced by the possibility of individual status 
improvement and abandon efforts towards group status improvement. By contrast, 
framing the collective action’s goal in promotion-oriented terms (e.g. by framing it as 
an ideal) should be less effective, as this should cause those who consider supporting 
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the group to adopt a promotion focus and put them at risk of being lured away from 
engaging in collective action by the possibility of individual status improvement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The results of two experiments showed that adoption of a promotion focus leads 
members of a low status group to pursue individual status improvement under 
conditions of token permeability, whereas the adoption of a prevention focus causes 
them to pursue group status improvement. No effects of promotion and prevention focus 
were observed when the properties of the status system were unambiguous, as group 
boundaries were closed. These results show how recognizing the distinction between 
promotion and prevention orientations can help us understand how low status group 
members make sense of token situations, as they focus on different situational aspects 
and the (im-)possibilities for status improvement these imply as a way to decide which 
course of action to adopt. 
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Footnotes 
1
 This chapter is based on Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, and Derks (2011a) 
2 
 The measures of engagement in efforts towards group and individual status 
improvement would be interdependent when all participants would complete the same 
number of anagrams. Instead, these two measures were only modestly correlated (r(59) 
= -.44, p < .001), indicating that effort exerted not only refers to the choices made for 
each anagram (i.e., to work at individual vs. group status improvement) but also to the 
number of anagrams solved during the four minutes they were allotted. To make sure 
that these differences were due to participants’ level of motivation, not their level of 
ability, we controlled for perceived difficulty of the anagram task in these analyses.  
3 Although we analyzed the log-transformed mean response latencies, we report 
the untransformed mean response latencies and their standard deviations (in seconds) 
here in order to facilitate interpretation of the results. 
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Introduction 
 
Sometimes members of disadvantaged groups are willing to face overwhelming 
odds to improve their group’s position. An example is the recent uprising in Burma. 
Although the Burmese regime - a military junta - violently quashes any threat to its 
power and protest has very little chance of success, still in 2007 hundreds of thousands 
of Burmese citizens took to the streets to protest against their government. At other 
times, people’s motivation to engage in collective action appears more instrumental; 
they participate only when they believe that collective action will help achieve social 
change. For example, in the context of union activism, the perceived likelihood that 
collective action will achieve its desired goal has been found to be a strong predictor of 
participation in collective action (Flood, 1993; Klandermans, 1984a, 1984b, 1986). 
Thus, previous work has established that some instances of collective action are driven 
by the perceived likelihood that they will succeed, whereas others are driven by the 
importance attached to their goal (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Van Stekelenburg, 
Klandermans, & Van Dijk, 2009). Building on these insights, the purpose of the present 
research is to examine when and why collective action is driven by instrumental motives 
or by the perceived importance of its goal. More specifically, we aim to address this 
question using insights from regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; Shah & Higgins, 
1997). We will show that for individuals under promotion focus, the motivation to 
engage in collective action is driven by the likelihood that through this action important 
social change will be achieved. By contrast, we will show that for individuals under 
prevention focus the motivation to engage in collective action is unaffected by the 
likelihood of social change, provided its goal is deemed sufficiently important. 
In the next section, we will discuss existing work on the motivation to engage in 
collective action. We then introduce regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) and 
explain how insights relevant to self-regulation can advance our understanding of 
individual motivation to engage in collective action. 
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Individual Motivation to Engage in Collective Action 
 
Collective action - cooperative effort towards group goals - can be a powerful 
instrument for low status groups to increase their social status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Previous research has demonstrated that perceiving one’s group as being disadvantaged 
increases an individual’s motivation to engage in collective action aimed at improving 
the group’s relative position (Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2002; Smith & 
Ortiz, 2002). Thus, the disadvantaged position of a social group is likely to increase the 
importance group members attach to social change and to elicit their motivation to 
engage in collective action. 
Nevertheless, even when they recognize the disadvantaged position of their 
group, members of low status groups do not always perceive collective action as an 
attractive option (Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright & Taylor, 1998). One reason for 
this is that they may not believe that collective action will result in the desired social 
change. Research exploring this possibility has found that the perceived likelihood that 
collective action will result in social change generally increases the motivation to 
engage in collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). However, there 
are also a number of studies that have failed to find support for this relationship (e.g., 
Fox-Cardamone, Hinkle & Hogue, 2000; Fox & Schofield, 1989; Schofield & 
Pavelchak, 1989). Likewise, research among real-world collective activists has not 
consistently shown that the perceived likelihood of social change is a strong predictor of 
enduring commitment to collective action (Kelly, 1993; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & 
Simon, 2004, 2005; Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jorger, 2003). Thus, individuals’ 
commitment to collective action is not always determined by how likely they perceive 
that through this action important social change will be achieved. This raises the 
question as to when individuals commit to collective action, and why sometimes they 
may be willing to do so regardless of the perceived likelihood that this action will lead 
to social change. We propose that the principles outlined by regulatory focus theory 
(Higgins, 1997) can help answer this question. 
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A Self-regulation Approach to Engagement in Collective Action 
 
Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between two motivational systems that 
regulate goal-directed behaviour: promotion focus and prevention focus. Activation of 
the promotion and prevention foci differentially affects the way in which goals are 
construed (i.e. as ideals or as oughts respectively), the preferred strategies for pursuing 
these goals (i.e. through approach or avoidance), and the emotional reactions associated 
with success and failure (cheerfulness and dejection vs. quiescence and agitation). The 
strength of promotion and prevention focus varies both chronically across individuals 
and momentarily across situations (Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, Idson, & Ayduk, 2001). 
Adoption of a promotion focus indicates a concern with gain and the achievement of 
growth and accomplishment goals. Individuals under promotion focus construe goals as 
ideals, or as maximal goals that they would ideally like to accomplish, and initiate goal 
pursuit when they perceive opportunities for goal-advancement (Shah & Higgins, 1997). 
By contrast, a prevention focus indicates a concern with safety and the fulfilment of 
duties and responsibilities. Individuals under prevention focus construe goals as 
“oughts”, or as minimal goals that should be accomplished, and initiate goal-pursuit out 
of a sense of necessity (Shah & Higgins, 1997).  
We connect to current insights on promotion and prevention orientation to 
predict when, and for which individuals, the importance and/or the likelihood of social 
change motivate engagement in collective action aimed at achieving this change. 
Individuals under promotion focus should be inclined to construe social change as a 
maximal aspiration they would ideally like to accomplish, which affords them flexibility 
in waiting for opportunities for goal advancement. As a result, individuals under 
promotion focus initiate goal-pursuit based on opportunity for goal-advancement rather 
than out of necessity (Shah & Higgins, 1997). Thus, when social change increases in 
perceived importance, individuals under promotion focus should therefore become more 
attentive to opportunities for attaining this goal. Provided they believe that social 
change is important, individuals under promotion focus should be motivated to engage 
in collective action by the perception that achievement of its goal is likely (Hypothesis 
1).  
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By contrast, under prevention orientation, individuals should construe social 
change as a minimally acceptable outcome. When such a minimal goal increases 
in importance, it becomes a necessity that must be pursued regardless of the expected 
outcome (Shah & Higgins, 1997). Thus, individuals under prevention orientation should 
construe the achievement of highly important social change as a necessity, which should 
cause them to pursue this change, even if the likelihood that it will be achieved is low. 
When the perceived importance of social change is relatively low (i.e., when social 
change is not seen as a necessity), prevention oriented individuals should be more 
sensitive to the likelihood of social change in their decision to engage in collective 
action. In this case investing in unsuccessful collective action should represent a loss of 
time and effort, whereas engagement in successful collective action should be 
considered a safe investment. Thus we predict that individuals under prevention focus 
should be motivated to pursue social change when they see it as highly important. This 
should be the case even if the perceived likelihood that this goal will be achieved is low. 
When social change is deemed relatively unimportant, individuals under prevention 
focus should only be motivated to engage in collective action to the extent that they 
believe that the likelihood of social change is high (Hypothesis 2). 
 
Overview of the Present Research 
 
To test these predictions we conducted three studies. We used a paradigm in 
which women were made aware of the unfair treatment of their gender-group in work 
situations. They were told that because of gender discrimination, women earn less and 
receive fewer opportunities for job-advancement than men. To give participants the 
possibility to take a stance against this discrimination, a collective action group was 
then introduced (in actuality this group was fictitious). The extent to which the 
participants were actually willing to commit themselves to collective action was 
measured through the support they gave to the collective action group on its (bogus) 
website.  
Across the three studies we used different ways to examine the prediction that 
regulatory focus influences the way in which the importance and likelihood of social 
change affect commitment to collective action. In Study 3.1, we assessed chronic 
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individual differences in regulatory focus and naturally occurring variations in the 
perceived importance of the collective action group’s goal, while manipulating the 
likelihood that the goal would be reached. In Study 3.2, we assessed chronic individual 
differences in regulatory focus in a different way and experimentally manipulated both 
the importance of the group’s goal and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved. 
Finally, In Study 3.3 we manipulated regulatory focus, and assessed naturally occurring 
differences in the importance of the group’s goal and perceived likelihood that the goal 
would be achieved. Thus, across the three studies all independent variables were 
manipulated at least once, allowing us to rule out alternative causal interpretations of the 
results. In all three studies participants’ commitment to collective action served as the 
dependent variable. 
 
Study 3.1 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Eighty-two female undergraduate students from Leiden University (Mage = 
19.65, SD = 2.33), participated in exchange for €3 or course credit. They were randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a one-factor (likelihood that the collective action group 
would reach its goal: high vs. low) between-participants design. Participants’ chronic 
regulatory focus and the importance they placed on the goal of the collective action 
group were measured and treated as independent variables. Commitment to collective 
action formed the dependent variable. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they would be taking part in two unrelated studies: a 
short survey and an experiment. The survey consisted of the pre-measure of regulatory 
focus. Participants’ chronic promotion and prevention focus were assessed with the 
RFQ-Proverb Questionnaire (Van Stekelenburg, 2006). Six items assessed promotion 
strength (e.g., “Nothing ventured, nothing gained.”, α = .75) and six items prevention 
strength (e.g., “Cobbler, stick to thy last, α = .54). We created a regulatory focus 
dominance measure by subtracting the standardized scores on the prevention scale from 
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the standardized scores on the promotion scale (Keller & Bless, 2006; Sassenberg, 
Jonas, Shah & Brazy, 2007). High values on this measure indicated a dominant 
promotion focus; low values a dominant prevention focus. 
Participants were then informed that the first study was completed and that the 
second study would now commence. Subsequently, participants read a research report 
supposedly written by two well-known Dutch research organizations. In reality, this 
report was constructed to make participants aware of the disadvantaged position of their 
group (women) in work situations. Participants read that women earn approximately 7 
percent less than men for the same work, and receive fewer opportunities for job 
advancement. Finally, participants read a pamphlet in which a collective action group 
presented a plan to counter the discrimination women face in work situations (in 
actuality the group was fictitious). In the pamphlet the collective action group asked the 
participants to indicate their support on its website. 
To manipulate the likelihood that the collective action group would reach its 
goal, we varied the contents of the research report and the collective action group’s 
pamphlet. In the high likelihood condition, participants read that initiatives against 
gender discrimination in work situations tend to have considerable effects and that the 
collective action group expected to achieve its goals. In the low likelihood condition, 
participants read that initiatives against gender discrimination in work situations tend to 
be low in success and that the collective action group expected the achievement of its 
goals to be quite difficult. 
 
Measures 
All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 9 (completely agree), unless otherwise indicated. 
Manipulation check. The perceived likelihood that the collective action group 
would be successful was measured with a single item (“I think the collective action 
group will be successful in its struggle against gender discrimination in work 
situations”). 
The importance participants attached to the goal of the collective action group 
was measured with four items (e.g., “I think it’s very important to counter gender 
discrimination in work situations”, M = 7.43, SD = 0.92, α = .85). 
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Commitment to collective action. Participants were then connected to the 
(fictitious) website of the collective action group. There they could choose to support 
the collective action group by 1) signing a petition, 2) becoming a member of the group, 
and/or 3) signing up for participation in a demonstration by the group against gender 
discrimination. These items were constructed to measure collective action at increasing 
levels of commitment, thus forming a cumulative Guttman scale (Guttman, 1947). 
Analyses confirmed the Guttman nature of the scale.5 Therefore, we summed the 
number of ways in which each participant chose to support the collective action group 
to form the measure of commitment to collective action (Green, 1956; Kelloway & 
Barling, 1993).  
 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
As intended, an ANOVA on the manipulation check showed that participants in 
the high likelihood condition expected the collective action group to be significantly 
more successful (M = 6.93, SD = 1.03) than participants in the low likelihood condition 
(M = 6.34, SD = 0.99, F(1, 87) = 6.85, p = .01, ηp2 = .08).  
 
Commitment to collective action 
The data for the commitment to collective action measure were analyzed with 
hierarchical multiple regression using the effect-coded likelihood manipulation, the 
standardized regulatory focus dominance and importance scales and their two- and 
three-way interactions as predictors. The three-way interaction between the likelihood 
manipulation and the regulatory focus dominance and importance scales was significant 
(B = .26, SE = .08, F(1, 74) = 11.55, p = .001, ∆R2 = .12). We used simple slope 
analysis to break down this three-way interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). The results 
revealed the predicted interaction between the importance of the collective action 
group’s goal and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved among individuals 
under promotion focus (B = .34, SE = .10, F(1, 74) = 11.85, p < .001, Figure 3.1). As 
expected (Hypothesis 1), for individuals under promotion focus who placed high 
importance (+1 SD) on the goal of the collective action group, commitment to collective 
action was higher in the high likelihood condition than in the low likelihood condition 
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(B = .30, SE = .12, F(1, 74) = 6.75, p = .01). When they placed low importance (-1 SD) 
on the goal of the collective action group, commitment to collective action was actually 
lower in the high likelihood condition than in the low likelihood condition (B = -.39, SE 
= .15, F(1, 74) = 6.80, p = .01).  
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Figure 3.1. Commitment to collective action as a function of the importance of social 
change and the manipulation of the likelihood of social change for individuals with a 
dominant promotion orientation (Study 3.1). 
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Figure 3.2. Commitment to collective action as a function of the importance of social 
change and the manipulation of the likelihood of social change for individuals with a 
dominant prevention orientation (Study 3.1). 
 
For individuals under prevention focus the results revealed a different interaction 
between importance and likelihood (B = -.18, SE = .10, F(1, 74) = 3.58, p = .06, Figure 
3.2). As predicted (Hypothesis 2), when individuals under prevention focus placed high 
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importance on the goal of the collective action group, there was no effect of the 
likelihood that the collective action group would be successful (B = -.13, SE = .13, F(1, 
74) = 0.99, p = .32). Only individuals under prevention focus who placed low 
importance (-1 SD) on the goal displayed slightly more commitment to collective action 
in the high likelihood condition than in the low likelihood condition (B = .24, SE = .14, 
F(1, 74) = 3.15, p = .08). 
 
Discussion 
The results of this first study offer support for the prediction that regulatory 
focus influences how the importance and likelihood of social change affect individuals’ 
motivation to engage in collective action. As expected, for individuals under a dominant 
promotion focus, the likelihood that collective action would be successful increased 
commitment to collective action, provided that its goal was seen as important. By 
contrast, individuals under a dominant prevention focus who perceived the goal of the 
collective action group as important were willing to support the group regardless of the 
likelihood that it would be successful. For these individuals, the likelihood that the 
collective action group would be successful only (slightly) increased commitment to 
collective action when relatively low importance was placed on its goal. In addition to 
these predicted effects, there was also an unanticipated observation. For individuals 
under a dominant promotion focus who placed relatively little importance on the 
collective action group’s goal, commitment to collective action was actually lowered by 
the perceived likelihood that this goal might be achieved. We expected perceived 
likelihood to have less of an effect in this situation but not necessarily to lower 
commitment to collective action. We will assess the reliability of this unexpected 
finding in Studies 3.2 and 3.3. 
Importantly, because two of the independent variables (regulatory focus and the 
importance of the collective action group’s goal) were assessed as naturally occurring 
differences between participants, the usual objections to making causal inferences based 
on (partial) correlational data apply to this study. Therefore, in Study 3.2 we 
experimentally manipulated both the importance of the collective action group’s goal 
and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved. In addition, we used a different 
measure of regulatory focus to obtain convergent support for our predictions. 
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Study 3.2 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and fifty-three female undergraduate students from Leiden 
University (Mage = 20.39, SD = 2.29) participated in exchange for €3.50 or course credit. 
They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (importance of the collective 
action group’s goal: high vs. low) X 2 (likelihood that this goal would be achieved: high 
vs. low) between-participants factorial design. Participants’ regulatory focus was 
measured as an independent variable prior to the experiment. 
 
Procedure 
We used the same procedure as in Study 3.1, with two differences. First, we 
used a different measure to assess regulatory focus. Second, we manipulated - rather 
than measured - the importance placed on the goal of the collective action group. We 
used the same manipulation of the likelihood that the collective action group would 
reach its goal as in Study 3.1. As in Study 3.1, participants were informed that they 
would be taking part in two unrelated studies: a short survey and an experiment.  
The short survey consisted of the pre-measure of regulatory focus. Participants’ 
chronic promotion and prevention focus were measured using eight items taken from 
the Lockwood scale (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002). Four items assessed 
promotion strength (e.g., “I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the 
future”, α = .66). and four items prevention strength (e.g., “I frequently think about how 
I can prevent failures in my life”, α = .61). As in Study 3.1, we calculated a regulatory 
focus dominance measure by subtracting the standardized prevention scores from the 
standardized promotion scores. 
Participants then read the research report about the unfair treatment of women in 
work situations. After this, we manipulated the importance placed on the collective 
action group’s goal. Research on the behaviour–attitude link (cf., Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959; Janis & King, 1954; King and Janis, 1956) has shown that individuals- 
when presenting a persuasive argument- adapt their private opinions in the direction of 
the position they argue. We used this as the basis for the importance manipulation. 
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Participants wrote a short paragraph in which they argued either in favour of (high 
importance condition) or against (low importance condition) the importance of striving 
for gender equality in work situations (the goal of the collective action group). Next, 
participants read the collective action group’s pamphlet and completed the dependent 
measures. 
 
Measures 
All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 9 (completely agree), unless otherwise indicated. 
Manipulation checks. The perceived importance of the collective action group’s 
goal was measured with a single item (“I think countering gender discrimination in 
work situations is not crucial” [reverse scored]). The perceived likelihood that the 
collective action group would reach its goal was measured in the same way as in Study 
3.1.  
Commitment to collective action. As in Study 3.1, participants were connected to 
the (fictitious) website of the collective action group. There they could choose to 
support the collective action group by 1) signing a petition, 2) signing up for the action 
group’s newsletter (item added in Study 3.2), 3) becoming a member of the action 
group, and/or 4) signing up for participation in a demonstration against gender 
discrimination (items ordered from low to high commitment). Analyses confirmed the 
Guttman nature of the scale.6 We thus summed the number of ways in which each 
participant chose to support the collective action group to form the measure of 
commitment to collective action.  
 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
As intended, an importance × likelihood ANOVA on the manipulation check of 
importance showed that participants in the high importance conditions reported placing 
more importance on the goal of the collective action group (M = 8.01, SD = 1.17) than 
participants in the low importance conditions (M = 7.51, SD = 1.45, F(1, 149) = 6.13, p 
= .01, ηp2 = .04). No other effects emerged (p’s > .30).  
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An importance × likelihood ANOVA on the manipulation check of likelihood 
showed that participants in the low likelihood conditions reported a somewhat lower 
perceived likelihood that the collective action group would reach its goal (M = 5.96, SD 
= 1.46) than did participants in the high likelihood conditions (M = 6.40, SD = 1.33, 
F(1, 149) = 3.80, p = .06, ηp2 = .02). No other effects emerged (p’s > .66).  
 
Commitment to collective action 
The results for the commitment to collective action measure were analyzed in 
the same way as in Study 3.1. As expected, the three-way interaction between the 
regulatory focus dominance scale and the manipulations of importance and likelihood 
was significant (B = .17, SE = .06, F(1, 145) = 8.54, p = .004, ∆R2 = .05). Simple slope 
analysis (Aiken & West, 1991), revealed the predicted interaction (Hypothesis 1) 
between the importance and likelihood of social change among individuals under 
promotion focus (B = .15, SE = .08, F(1, 145) = 3.50, p = .06, ∆R2 = .02, Figure 3.3). As 
expected, the likelihood that the collective action group would reach its goal increased 
commitment to collective action among individuals under promotion focus in the high 
importance condition (B = .28, SE =.14, F(1, 74) = 4.04, p = .05) but not in the low 
importance condition (B = -.02, SE = .09, F(1, 71) < 1, p = .84).  
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Figure 3.3. Commitment to collective action as a function of the manipulations of the 
importance and likelihood of social change for individuals with a dominant promotion 
orientation (Study 3.2). 
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As in Study 3.1, we found a different interaction between importance and 
likelihood among individuals under prevention orientation (B = -.18, SE = .07, F(1, 145) 
= 6.02, p = .02, ∆R2 = .04, Figure 3.4). As expected (Hypothesis 2), among individuals 
under prevention focus who placed high importance on the collective action group’s 
goal, the likelihood that this goal could be achieved did not increase (and even slightly 
decreased) commitment to collective action (B = -.21, SE = .11, F(1, 74) = 3.59, p = 
.06). Among individuals under prevention focus who placed low importance on the 
collective action group’s goal, the likelihood of social change did not reliably affect 
commitment to collective action (B = .15, SE = .09, F(1, 71) = 2.60, p = .11). 
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Figure 3.4. Commitment to collective action as a function of the manipulations of the 
importance and likelihood of social change for individuals with a dominant prevention 
orientation (Study 3.2). 
 
Discussion 
 
The results of this study offer additional support for the prediction that 
individuals’ regulatory focus influences the way in which the importance and likelihood 
of social change affect commitment to collective action. As predicted, individuals under 
promotion focus were motivated to engage in collective action by the perceived 
likelihood that it would be successful, provided they perceived its goal as important. 
Also as predicted, among individuals under prevention focus who placed high 
importance on the collective action group’s goal, the likelihood of social change did not 
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increase commitment to collective action. For both individuals under promotion and 
prevention focus, the likelihood of social change had no effect on commitment to 
collective action when low importance was attached to the goal of the collective action 
group. Thus, the unexpected negative effect of the likelihood that the collective action 
group would be successful that was found among individuals under promotion focus in 
Study 3.1 did not emerge in Study 3.2.  
Study 3.2 extends the results of Study 3.1 by showing the causal role that the 
perceived importance of social change plays in individual commitment to collective 
action. Also, Study 3.2 demonstrates similar results as Study 3.1 using a different 
measure of regulatory focus, attesting to the robustness of these findings. However, we 
wished to demonstrate that inducing a promotion or prevention focus would be 
sufficient to produce the same results. Therefore we conducted a third study in which 
regulatory focus was experimentally manipulated. 
 
Study 3.3 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-two female undergraduate students from Leiden University (Mage = 20.86, 
SD = 3.02), participated in exchange for €3 or course credit. They were randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a one-factor (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) 
between-participants design. The perceived importance of the collective action group’s 
goal and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved were measured as independent 
variables.  
 
Procedure  
We used the same procedure as in Studies 3.1 and 3.2, with two exceptions. 
First, we manipulated - instead of measured - regulatory focus. Second, this time we 
measured - instead of manipulated - the importance and likelihood of social change. 
We manipulated regulatory focus with an adapted version of the procedure 
suggested by Higgins and colleagues (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Prior 
to being presented with the other materials, participants wrote about what they would 
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ideally like to (promotion condition) or felt they ought to (prevention condition) achieve 
in their working life. According to Higgins and colleagues (1994) the priming of ideals 
causes individuals to adopt a promotion focus, whereas the priming of oughts causes 
individuals to adopt a prevention focus.  
Participants then read the same research report about the disadvantaged position 
of women in work situation as in Studies 3.1 and 3.2. The time they needed to report 
their (promotion- and prevention-related) emotional reactions to this information served 
as the check of the regulatory focus manipulation. According to Shah and Higgins 
(2001), individuals under promotion focus are faster at appraising how cheerful or 
dejected a stimulus makes them feel, whereas individuals under prevention focus are 
faster at appraising how quiescent or agitated a stimulus makes them feel. We thus 
measured participants’ promotion-related (dejection and cheerfulness) and prevention-
related (agitation and quiescence) emotions using six items and recorded the time they 
needed to indicate their answers to serve as the manipulation check of regulatory focus. 
 
Measures 
All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 9 (completely agree), unless otherwise indicated. 
The importance participants placed on the collective action group’s goal was 
assessed with three items (e.g., “I think it is very important to counter gender 
discrimination in work situations”, M = 7.51, SD = 1.22, α = .88). 
The likelihood that the collective action group would be successful was assessed 
with six items (e.g., “I think the collective action group will be successful in their 
struggle against gender discrimination in work situations, M = 6.13, SD = 1.03, α = .76). 
Commitment to collective action was measured and treated in the same way as in 
Study 3.2.7  
 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
We created promotion- and prevention-latency scores by log-transforming 
response times on the promotion-related (cheerfulness and dejection) and prevention 
related (agitation and quiescence) emotion items (cf., Shah & Higgins, 2001). We then 
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created a regulatory focus measure by subtracting the promotion latency scores from the 
prevention latency scores (with high scores indicating faster responding to the 
promotion items than to the prevention items which signifies promotion dominance) and 
analyzed the effect of the manipulation of regulatory focus on this variable using 
ANOVA. As intended, the results revealed stronger promotion focus (and weaker 
prevention focus) in the promotion condition (M = 0.44, SD = 1.38) than in the 
prevention condition (M = -0.46, SD = 1.44, F(1, 50) = 5.27, p = .02, η2 = .10).8 
 
Commitment to Collective Action 
The results for the commitment to collective action measure were analyzed in 
the same way as in Studies 3.1 and 3.2. Three participants had to be excluded from 
these analyses because they indicated doubting the authenticity of the collective action 
group’s website.9 As in Studies 3.1 and 3.2, the three-way interaction between the 
manipulation of regulatory focus and the importance and likelihood scales was 
significant (B = .51, SE = .17, F(1, 41) = 8.87, p = .005, ∆R2 = .12). In the promotion 
condition, we found the predicted interaction (Hypothesis 2) between the importance 
and likelihood of social change (B = .19, SE = .09, F(1, 21) = 4.97, p = .04, ∆R2 = .09, 
Figure 3.5). As expected, in the promotion condition, the perceived likelihood that the 
collective action group would be successful increased commitment to collective action 
among participants who attached high importance (+1 SD) to the group’s goal (B = .34, 
SE = .14, F(1, 21) = 5.92, p = .02), whereas it had no effect on commitment to collective 
action among participants who attached low importance (-1 SD) to the group’s goal (B 
= -.04, SE = .12, F(1, 21) < 1, p = .73). 
In the prevention condition, the results revealed a different interaction between 
the importance and likelihood measures (B = -.82, SE = .40, F(1, 20) = 4.32, p = .05, 
∆R2 = .15, Figure 3.6). As expected (Hypothesis 1), in the prevention condition, 
commitment to collective action among participants who placed high importance (+1 
SD) on the collective action group’s goal did not depend on the likelihood that this 
group would be successful (B = -.05, SE = .33, F(1, 20) < 1, p = .88), whereas it did 
among participants who placed low importance (-1 SD) on the group’s goal (B = 1.60, 
SE = .60, F(1, 20) = 7.06, p = .02). 
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Figure 3.5. Commitment to collective action as a function of the importance and 
likelihood of social change in the promotion condition (Study 3.3). 
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Figure 3.6. Commitment to collective action as a function of the importance and 
likelihood of social change in the promotion condition (Study 3.3). 
 
Discussion 
Study 3.3 provided additional support for our prediction that regulatory focus 
influences the way in which the importance and likelihood of social change affect 
commitment to collective action. As hypothesized, individuals under promotion focus 
were motivated to engage in collective action by the perceived likelihood that it would 
be successful, provided that they perceived its goal as highly important. The likelihood 
that the collective action group’s goal would be achieved had no effect on commitment 
to collective action among individuals under promotion focus who perceived the 
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group’s goal as unimportant. Also as predicted, individuals under prevention focus who 
placed high importance on the goal of the collective action group were willing to 
commit to collective action regardless of the perceived likelihood that this group would 
reach its goal. Among individuals under prevention focus who placed relatively little 
importance on the collective action group’s goal, commitment to collective action was 
increased by the likelihood that this goal would be accomplished.  
Study 3.3 replicates and extends the results of Studies 3.1 and 3.2 by showing 
that the same results can be obtained using an experimental manipulation of regulatory 
focus, thereby demonstrating the causal influence of regulatory focus on how the 
decision to commit to collective action is made. Together with Studies 3.1 and 3.2, 
Study 3.3 thus confirms that the impact of the importance and likelihood of social 
change on commitment to collective action depends on the individuals’ regulatory 
focus.  
General Discussion 
 
The current research was designed to investigate the effect of regulatory focus 
on individuals’ motivation to engage in collective action. Taking a self-regulatory 
perspective allows us to provide new insights into the predictors of the motivation to 
engage in collective action. We argued that because individuals under promotion focus 
initiate goal-pursuit when they see opportunities for goal-advancement, they would 
engage in collective action when they both placed high importance on its goal and 
believed attainment of this goal to be likely. By contrast, because individuals under 
prevention focus initiate goal pursuit when they see goal-attainment as necessary, we 
expected that they would engage in collective action when attached high importance to 
the goal of the collective action, regardless of the perceived likelihood that this action 
would be successful. Individuals under prevention focus who placed relatively low 
importance on the goal of social change were expected to engage in collective action 
only to the extent that they believed it likely that this action would reach its goal (i.e., 
when goal attainment is assured).  
To investigate these predictions, we used a paradigm in which women were 
made aware of the unfair treatment of their group in work situations. Across three 
studies, we used different ways to investigate the prediction that regulatory focus 
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influences the way in which the importance and likelihood of social change affect 
individuals’ motivation to engage in collective action. In Study 3.1, we assessed chronic 
individual differences in regulatory focus and in the perceived importance attached to a 
collective action group’s goal, while manipulating the likelihood that this goal could be 
achieved through collective action. In Study 3.2, we used a different instrument to 
assess regulatory focus and manipulated both the perceived importance of the collective 
action group’s goal and the likelihood that this goal would be achieved. Finally, in 
Study 3.3, we manipulated regulatory focus. Because across studies each independent 
variable was manipulated at least once, alternative causal explanations of the results can 
be ruled out.  
Importantly, we used a behavioural measure of commitment to collective action. 
In all studies, the extent to which participants were actually willing to commit to 
collective action (e.g., by signing a petition, by becoming a member of the collective 
action group) served as our dependent variable. The results of the current studies thus 
reflect actual engagement in collective action, and not attitudes or intentions as is 
common in research on collective action.  
The results offer consistent support for our predictions. In all studies, individuals 
under promotion focus who attached importance to an action group’s goal were 
motivated to support this group to the degree that they perceived that the group would 
be successful in achieving this change. Additionally, in all studies we found that among 
individuals under prevention focus who placed high importance on the collective action 
group’s goal, support for this group did not depend on the likelihood that the group 
would reach its goal. Only when they placed relatively little importance on the 
collective action group’s goal did the likelihood that this goal would be achieved affect 
prevention oriented individuals’ engagement in collective action.10  
 
Implications 
These results show that not all individuals decide in the same way whether to 
engage in collective action or not. Individuals under promotion focus become motivated 
to engage in collective action by the perception that through collective action important 
social change is likely to be achieved. By contrast, attaching high importance to the goal 
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of the collective action made prevention oriented individuals less instrumental in their 
decision to engage in this action. 
Importantly, the current research sheds light on inconsistencies in previous work 
surrounding the effect of the likelihood of social change on the motivation to engage in 
collective action (cf., Hornsey et al., 2006; Kelly, 1993). Specifically, the likelihood of 
social change has consistently been shown to be strong predictor of union activism (e.g., 
Flood, 1993; Klandermans, 1984a; 1984b; 1986), but not of anti-nuclear activism (e.g., 
Fox-Cardamone et al., 2000; Fox & Schofield, 1989; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; 
Schofield & Pavelchak, 1989) The current results may offer an explanation for this 
inconsistency. Specifically, engagement in anti-nuclear collective action serves the need 
for safety, and should as such be regulated by the prevention system. This would 
explain why the likelihood of social change has not been found to be a strong motivator 
of this form of action. By contrast, engagement in union activism aimed at attaining 
employee benefits could be considered behaviour that serves the need for growth, and as 
such should be regulated by the promotion system. This explains why the likelihood 
that through this action important goals will be achieved has been found to be a strong 
predictor of engagement in union activism. 
Furthermore, the current work suggests that depending on the societal context in 
which collective action takes place, different ways of trying to motivate people to 
participate will be most effective. By framing their message in either promotion or 
prevention terms collective action groups can influence their potential followers into 
adopting either a promotion or prevention focus. The results of the current studies 
suggest that doing so should also influence the basis on which these potential followers 
decide whether or not to engage in collective action. Specifically, in contexts in which 
the achievement of social change seems unlikely or even impossible (for example 
because of insufficient support or oppression by another social group), activist groups 
that frame their message in prevention terms, (e.g., by presenting social change as a 
minimally acceptable outcome), are likely to be most effective in attracting followers. 
By contrast, activist groups that frame their message in promotion terms (e.g., by 
presenting social change as a maximal ideal outcome) will be most effective in 
attracting followers when the achievement of social change seems likely. The present 
findings also suggest that activist groups adopting a promotion frame in their 
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mobilization attempts would do well to also convey both the importance of their goal 
and the likelihood that this goal can be achieved in their communications. By contrast, 
when they use a prevention frame, emphasizing the importance of the collective goal 
should be enough. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
The current work investigated the role of regulatory focus in the way 
instrumental considerations motivate collective action. In doing so, it complements 
work that suggests that prevention (but not promotion) oriented individuals are 
motivated to engage in collective action by perceptions of group-based injustice or 
immorality (Sassenberg, & Hansen, 2007; Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, in 
press, b). In terms of theoretical integration, these results show how regulatory focus fits 
into the model by Van Zomeren and colleagues (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fisher, & 
Leach, 2004) in which instrumental considerations and perceptions of group-based 
injustice are held to form two distinct routes to engagement in collective action. 
However, instrumental and justice motives only form two of several possible pathways 
to engagement in collective action. Previous work has also identified collective 
identification and ideology as motives for engaging in collective action (Simon et al., 
1998; Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). A fruitful path for future research may therefore 
be to examine how regulatory focus relates to these pathways.  
In the current studies we focused on a specific class of collective action. 
Specifically, the forms of behaviour considered in the present studies can all be seen as 
normative collective action (Wright, 2001b). Previous research has identified non-
normative forms of collective action, such as engaging in violent protest, as an 
alternative way to achieve social change. These are clearly distinct from more 
normative and peaceful forms such as examined here (Corning & Myers, 2002; Lalonde 
& Cameron, 1994; Lalonde, Stroink, & Aleem, 2002; Wolfsfeld, Opp, Dietz, & Green, 
1994). An interesting issue for further research would therefore be to examine how the 
choice is made between normative and non-normative forms of collective action, and to 
what extent differences in regulatory focus impact on this choice. For example, 
prevention oriented individuals who perceive social change as highly important (i.e. as a 
necessity) might become willing to use more drastic forms of action and pursue this 
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goal “by any means necessary”. Two studies investigating this possibility are presented 
in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the results of three studies showed that regulatory focus influences how 
the importance and likelihood of social change affect individual commitment to 
collective action. For individuals under promotion focus, the likelihood that important 
social change will be achieved is the primary concern in their decision to engage in 
collective action. By contrast, as the goal of social change increases in importance, 
individuals under prevention focus become less concerned about the likelihood of 
achieving the goal when deciding whether or not to engage in collective action. 
Together the results show that both the likelihood and the importance of social change 
affect commitment to collective action, but in different ways depending on whether 
individuals are under promotion or prevention focus. 
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Footnotes 
4
 This chapter is based on Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, and Derks (in press, 
a) 
5 As in earlier work that used a Guttman scale to assess commitment to 
collective action (Kelloway & Barling, 1993), we assessed the quality of the Guttman 
scale by calculating its coefficients of reproducibility (Guttman, 1947), and scalability 
H (Mokken & Lewis, 1982; Van Schuur, 2003), and by fitting to it the structure 
assumed by the Guttman scale model: the Simplex (Guttman, 1954). Coefficients of 
reproducibility exceeding .90, coefficients of scalability exceeding .40, and good fit to 
the Simplex model indicate high quality Guttman scales. The measure showed a high 
coefficient of reproducibility (.99), a high degree of scalability (H = .69), and a good fit 
to the Simplex model (χ2(1, N = 82) = .33, p = .57, NNFI = 1, CFI = 1, RMSEA = 0). 
6
 The commitment to collective action scale showed good reproducibility (.99) 
and scalability (H = .44), and fitted well to the Simplex structure (χ2(3, N = 153) = 3.58, 
p = .31, NNFI = .94, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .04). 
7
 The commitment to collective action scale showed good reproducibility (.99) 
and scalability (H = .80), and fitted well to the Simplex structure (χ2(3, N = 49) = 1.19, 
p = .75, NNFI = 1, CFI = 1, RMSEA = 0). 
8
 We report the untransformed mean response latencies and their standard 
deviations here in order to facilitate interpretation of the results. 
9
 Including these participants in the analyses did not substantially alter the 
results (three-way interaction p = .006). 
10
 Although likelihood did not significantly increase commitment to collective 
action in Study 3.2 among prevention oriented individuals who placed relatively low 
importance on the collective action group’s goal, meta-analysis of this effect (Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985) showed that it was reliable across the three studies (r = .23, SE = .09, Z = 
2.56, p = .01). 
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Introduction 
 
In late 2005, youths from the poor suburban housing projects of Paris took to the 
streets to protest against their seemingly hopeless position. These protests quickly 
turned violent. Rioting soon spread to other French cities. At the end of the civil unrest, 
weeks later, thousands of cars had been burned and damage was estimated to be over 
$230 million (Landler, 2005). As this example demonstrates, people sometimes respond 
to the disadvantaged position of their group by engaging in violent protests and riots. At 
other times they do so by participating in more peaceful forms of protest. In the current 
research we investigate how individuals decide between taking peaceful vs. more 
violent forms of collective action from the perspective of regulatory focus theory 
(Higgins, 1997). By taking a self-regulatory perspective in our investigation of 
collective action, we aim to provide a further understanding of when and why members 
of low status groups sometimes choose to go beyond the rules of society, or even 
beyond what they themselves would normally find morally acceptable, to try to improve 
their group’s disadvantaged position.  
We argue that perceiving immoral treatment of the ingroup should form a strong 
motivation to engage in collective action among prevention-oriented individuals but not 
among promotion-oriented individuals. Crucially, we propose that a prevention 
orientation entails the kind of rationality in which strong motivation is experienced as 
necessity. This “necessity” is predicted to cause the prevention-oriented - when they 
hold a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group - to perceive any 
means as justified in order to achieve group status improvement. This should also be 
true for those means that are intended to harm the interests of those held responsible for 
the group’s disadvantage: hostile or non-normative forms of collective action (Wright, 
Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).  
In the next section we discuss hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. 
We then turn to work on moral conviction and regulatory focus and explain how 
integrating insights from these fields can help further our understanding of the 
willingness to engage in hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. 
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Hostile and Benevolent Forms of Collective Action 
 
Collective action – cooperative effort towards group status improvement– can be 
a powerful instrument for low status groups to improve their societal position (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). In the last decades, a large volume of social psychological research has 
attempted to identify factors that motivate members of low status groups to engage in 
this form of behaviour (cf. Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van 
Knippenberg, 1993; Klandermans, 1984; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; 
Simon et al., 1998; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). This research has 
taught us much about the conditions under which low status group members become 
motivated to improve the societal position of their group. However, most of this work 
has focused on the motivation to engage in relatively benevolent responses to group-
based disadvantage, such as signing petitions, participating in peaceful demonstrations 
and aligning oneself with legitimate political movements. In doing so, social 
psychological research has provided less insight into the willingness to engage in more 
hostile forms of collective action that are explicitly aimed at harming the interests of 
those held responsible for the group’s disadvantage, such as committing acts of 
vandalism and participating in riots (Brewer, 1999, but see Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 
2005; Reicher & Levine, 1994; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990a; 1990b; Wright & 
Taylor, 1998 for notable exceptions, see Gurr, 1993 for a sociological account). 
Importantly, previous work has found that both activists and lay people perceive 
these hostile forms of collective action to be clearly distinct from the more benevolent 
ones, indicating that individuals committed to collective action are not always willing to 
turn to hostile means such as rioting and vandalism to reach their goals (Corning & 
Myers, 2002; Lalonde & Cameron, 1994; Lalonde, Stroink, & Aleem, 2002; Scheepers, 
Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Wolfsfeld, Opp, Dietz, & Green, 1994). What is it 
that makes some members of low status groups decide that achievement of group status 
improvement justifies the use of these extreme, hostile means? Existing research on this 
topic suggests that people may only become willing to engage in hostile forms of 
collective action when their group is confronted with exceptionally unfair and immoral 
treatment (Wright et al., 1990a; 1990b). For this reason we believe that in order to 
understand the willingness to take hostile forms of collective action we must first 
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examine the role of morality in the decision to engage in collective action in more 
detail. 
 
Moral Conviction 
 
The extent to which individuals hold a moral conviction about the fair treatment 
of their group should form a strong motivator of collective action. The term moral 
conviction refers to a strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral 
or immoral (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka, 2002; Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka & 
Bauman, 2008; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). Moral convictions differ from other strong, but 
non-moral attitudes in that they are seen as universally applicable truths. For example, 
the preference for one form of music over another can be a strong attitude, but as a 
matter of personal taste or opinion it is not a moral attitude (Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 
2009). By contrast, attitudes about issues such as abortion, ethnic cleansing and murder 
are usually considered “moral” in nature in that they refer to the distinction between 
right and wrong. Individuals holding these moral attitudes 1) believe that their stance 
reflects what is objectively right, not just personal opinion, 2) contend that others, 
regardless of their background, should share their stance on these issues and, 3) 
experience feelings of anger when confronted with what is seen as “immorality” (Skitka 
et al., 2005). Moreover, moral conviction, more than other types of attitudes, carries 
within it the obligation to act (Skitka et al., 2005), and is even seen to justify aggression 
against those who do not share the same moral convictions (Mullen & Skitka, 2006). 
We apply these individual-level findings to understand group-level concerns. Based on 
these findings we argue that when group members who hold a moral conviction about 
the fair treatment of their group are confronted with unfair group-based treatment, they 
should experience group-based anger and feel an inner obligation to act against the 
disadvantage (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, in press). Both of these experiences 
are considered to be strong motivators of collective action (Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & 
Jörger, 2003; Van Zomeren, et al., 2004).  
However, we do not believe that having a strong moral conviction about the fair 
treatment of the group motivates actual engagement in collective action for all 
individuals or in all situations. In the next section we will argue that because moral 
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considerations function as “oughts” (Higgins, 1987; Skitka, 2003), their motivating 
force should depend on the strength of individuals’ prevention focus. We will then 
argue that prevention-oriented individuals who engage in collective action out of their 
moral convictions about the fair treatment of their group view the goal of this behaviour 
as a necessity, causing them to see the ends as justifying the means and paving the way 
for hostile forms of collective action. 
 
A Self-Regulation Approach to Collective Action 
 
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) distinguishes between two motivational 
systems that regulate goal directed behaviour: the prevention system and the promotion 
system. These systems affect which kinds of goals are pursued and how the motivation 
to pursue these goals is experienced. Prevention and promotion focus vary in strength 
both chronically across individuals and momentarily across situations (Higgins, 
Friedman, Harlow, Idson, & Ayduk, 2001).  
We argue that holding a moral conviction about the fair treatment of one’s group 
should predict engagement in collective action in response to group-based disadvantage 
among individuals with a strong prevention focus. Furthermore, we argue that this 
moral conviction should be less important in determining the way individuals with a 
weak prevention focus or individuals with a promotion focus respond to group-based 
disadvantage. Adoption of a prevention focus indicates a concern with safety and the 
fulfilment of duties and responsibilities, also referred to as “oughts”. Under prevention 
focus, strong motivation is experienced as the necessity of goal attainment, which 
causes unsuccessful goal pursuit to be seen as more negative than successful pursuit is 
seen as positive (Higgins, 1987; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Shah & Higgins, 
1997). Notably, moral considerations function as “oughts” (Higgins, 1987; Skitka, 
2003; Skitka & Mullen, 2002), as immorality is judged to be more negative than 
morality is judged to be positive (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; 1989). Viewed in this 
way, moral conviction forms the strong motivation to pursue specific prevention-
relevant goals. The fact that moral considerations function as oughts implies that the 
motivating effects of moral convictions should depend on the strength of the 
individual’s prevention focus. Thus, we predict that holding a moral conviction about 
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the fair treatment of one’s group should motivate collective action to redress to group-
based disadvantage among individuals with a strong prevention focus but not among 
individuals with a weak prevention focus (Hypothesis 1).  
By contrast, adoption of a promotion focus indicates a concern with gain and the 
achievement of growth and accomplishment goals rather than duties and 
responsibilities. Promotion-oriented individuals are motivated to pursue ideals, or 
maximal goals. A promotion orientation involves experiencing strong motivation as 
desire which causes successful goal pursuit to be seen as more positive than 
unsuccessful pursuit is seen as negative. (Higgins, 1987; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 
2000; Shah & Higgins, 1997). Thus, because moral considerations function as “oughts” 
and not as “ideals”, we don’t anticipate that holding a moral conviction about the fair 
treatment of the group should motivate collective action to redress group-based 
disadvantage among individuals under promotion focus. 
 
Hostile Forms of Collective Action 
 
We propose that holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of 
their group should cause prevention-oriented individuals to overcome normative 
objections (and even their own moral objections) to hostile forms of collective action. 
Prevention-oriented individuals construe strong goals, such as those mandated by moral 
conviction, as necessities (Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010; Shah & 
Higgins, 1997; Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, in press, a). When pursuing a 
goal of which the achievement is seen as a necessity, it should not matter how this goal 
is achieved, as long as it is achieved. This means that prevention-oriented individuals 
(but not promotion-oriented individuals) who hold a strong moral conviction about the 
fair treatment of their group should consider hostile forms of collective action as 
justified means to a necessary end. Thus, we predict that for prevention-oriented 
individuals, holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group 
should motivate support for hostile forms of collective action (Hypothesis 2).  
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Overview of the Studies 
 
Two studies were conducted to test the predictions concerning individual 
prevention focus and engagement in different forms of collective action. We used a 
paradigm in which women were made aware of the discrimination of their group in 
work situations. They were then asked to indicate their support for several hostile and 
benevolent forms of collective reactions to this discrimination (Corning & Myers, 2002; 
Wolfsfeld, Opp, Dietz, & Green, 1994). The extent to which participants supported 
these hostile and benevolent forms of collective action served as the dependent variable 
in both studies.  
We used different ways to examine how support for hostile and benevolent 
forms of collective reactions to social discrimination among women is affected by 
regulatory focus and by the strength of their moral conviction about the equality 
between men and women. In Study 4.1, chronic individual differences in promotion and 
prevention focus and the strength of participants’ moral conviction about the equality 
between men and women were assessed as independent variables. In Study 4.2, we used 
a situational induction of regulatory focus, instead of assessing it as an individual 
difference variable, and again assessed naturally occurring variations in the strength of 
participants’ moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group as an independent 
variable. In addition, we included an assessment of moral objection to hostile forms of 
collective action as a potential moderator.  
 
Study 4.1 
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty-two female undergraduate students from Leiden 
University (Mage = 20.44, SD = 2.24) participated for €3 or course credit.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were informed that they would be taking part in two unrelated 
studies: a short survey and an experiment. The short survey consisted of our pre-
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measure of regulatory focus. We measured participants’ chronic promotion (α = .81) 
and prevention focus (α = .76) with a shortened version of the Lockwood scale 
(Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002).12 Participants were then informed that the first 
study was completed and that the second study would now commence. Next, they read a 
research report supposedly written by two well-known Dutch research organizations, 
which was constructed to make participants aware of the disadvantaged position of their 
group (women) in work situations. Participants read that women earn approximately 7 
percent less than men for the same work, and receive fewer opportunities for job 
advancement.  
 
Measures 
All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 9 (completely agree). The correlations between the measures are included 
in Table 4.1. 
The strength of participants’ moral conviction about gender equality was 
measured using five items (e.g. “Equality between men and women is part of the core of 
my moral convictions”, α = .76).  
Support for benevolent forms of collective action was measured by asking 
participants to report the extent to which they supported four different types of 
benevolent collective action (e.g. “Becoming a member of a collective action group that 
takes a stance against gender discrimination”, α = .92). 
Support for hostile forms of collective action was measured by asking 
participants to report the extent to which they supported four different types of hostile 
(and illegal) action (e.g. “Committing sabotage within discriminating organizations”, α 
= .78).13  
 
Results 
We used hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypothesis that prevention 
focus influences the effect of the strength of the moral conviction about gender equality 
on support for hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. For the analyses of 
both dependent variables the standardized promotion and prevention measures and the 
standardized measure of moral conviction about the gender equality were entered into 
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the analysis in the first step. In the second step, the two two-way interaction terms 
between the moral conviction measure and each of the regulatory focus measures were 
included.  
 
Table 4.1. Correlations between measures (Study 4.1) 
       2. 3. 4. 5.     
1. Prevention focus     .12 .14 .25*** .14 
2. Promotion focus      .28*** .12 .03 
3. Moral conviction about gender equality    .26*** .31*** 
4. Support for benevolent collective action      .37*** 
5. Support for hostile collective action      
  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Support for benevolent forms of collective action 
Analysis of the support for benevolent forms of collective action showed the 
predicted interaction between prevention focus and the strength of participants’ moral 
conviction about gender equality, B = .23, SE = .10, F(1, 176) = 5.47, p = .02, ∆R2 = 
.03, see Figure 4.1. Simple slope analyses of this effect (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed 
that the strength of participants’ moral conviction about gender equality increased 
support for benevolent forms of collective action among participants high in prevention 
focus (+1 SD), B = .54, SE = .13, F(1, 176) = 16.10, p < .001, but not among 
participants low in prevention focus, (-1 SD), B = .09, SE = .16, F(1, 176) < 1, p = .56. 
Promotion focus was unrelated to support for benevolent forms of collective action, B = 
.02, SE = .11, F(1, 176) < 1, p = .84, as was its interaction with the strength of 
participants’ moral conviction about gender equality, B = -.11, SE = .09, F(1, 176) = 
1.47, p = .23.  
 
Support for Hostile forms of Collective Action 
Analysis of the support for hostile forms of collective action measure showed 
the predicted interaction between prevention focus and the strength of participants’ 
moral conviction about gender equality, B = .30, SE = .10, F(1, 176) = 8.29, p = .004, 
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∆R2 = .04, see Figure 4.2. As expected, simple slope analyses revealed that the strength 
of participants’ moral conviction about gender equality increased support for hostile 
forms of collective action among individuals high in prevention focus, (+1 SD), B = .73, 
SE = .14, F(1, 178) = 26.82, p < .001, but not among participants low in prevention 
focus, (-1 SD), B = .13, SE = .16, F < 1. Promotion focus was unrelated to support for 
hostile forms of collective action, B = -.12, SE = .12, F(1, 176) = 1.05, p = .31, as was 
its interaction with the strength of participants’ moral conviction about gender equality, 
B = -.01, SE = .09, F < 1. 
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Figure 4.1. Support for benevolent forms of collective action as a function of prevention 
focus and the strength of the moral conviction about the gender equality (Study 4.1). 
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Figure 4.2. Support for hostile forms of collective action as a function of prevention 
focus and the strength of the moral conviction about gender equality (Study 4.1). 
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Discussion and Introduction to Study 4.2 
The results of this first study provide initial evidence for the hypothesis that 
support for both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action in response to social 
discrimination can best be seen as prevention-oriented response to perceived 
immorality. As expected, among participants high in prevention focus, the strength of 
moral conviction about gender equality increased endorsement of both hostile and 
benevolent forms of collective action. Among participants with low prevention focus, 
the strength of this moral conviction had no effect on the endorsement of either form of 
collective action. Also as expected, promotion focus did not influence the relation 
between the strength of the moral conviction about gender equality and the support for 
either form of collective action.  
However this first study does have some limitations. First of all, the fact that 
regulatory focus was assessed, rather than manipulated, leaves open another explanation 
of the results. Previous work has shown that becoming aware of being a member of a 
disadvantaged group in itself can cause individuals to adopt a prevention focus 
(Oyserman, Uskul, Yoder, Nesse & Williams, 2007; Seibt & Forster, 2004). Therefore, 
it could be the chronic awareness of being a member of a disadvantaged group, rather 
than the chronic prevention focus resulting from it, that causes support for hostile forms 
of collective action when this disadvantage is seen as immoral. In addition, recent work 
has identified some shortcomings of the Lockwood scale that was used as a measure of 
regulatory focus in Study 4.1 (Summerville & Roese, 2008). For these reasons a 
different, experimental, operationalisation of regulatory focus was employed in Study 
4.2  
A second concern with the current study is that, based on its results, we cannot 
yet rule out that it is the perceived importance of countering gender inequality rather 
than the moral conviction with which this goal is pursued, that is responsible for the 
effects (cf. Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). For this reason, we controlled for the 
effects of the perceived importance of countering gender inequality when examining the 
influence of moral convictions in Study 4.2. 
In addition, an important question that is left unanswered by Study 4.1 concerns 
the moral objections people may have against hostile forms of collective action. If 
prevention-oriented individuals base their decision of whether or not to support hostile 
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forms of collective action on moral reasoning, then at the same time these individuals 
may be deterred from the use of such forms of collective action by the perception that 
these behaviours are immoral. While we acknowledge this possibility, we also argue 
that moral objections to hostile forms of collective action will not always decrease 
support for this form of action among prevention-oriented individuals. More 
specifically, we argue that for prevention-oriented individuals strong motivation (such 
as the motivation to pursue gender equality for those who hold this goal with moral 
conviction) is experienced as necessity of goal attainment (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Zaal 
et al., in press, a). We argue that this perceived necessity of goal attainment may 
supersede moral objections to the way these goals are pursued, causing individuals to 
believe that in this particular instance the use of “immoral” hostile forms of collective 
action is justified. Therefore, we predict that holding moral objections to hostile forms 
of collective action should decrease support for these forms of action among prevention-
oriented individuals without a strong moral conviction about gender equality, but not 
among prevention-oriented individuals holding a strong moral conviction about gender 
equality. Among individuals under promotion focus, neither the strength of moral 
objections to hostile forms of collective action nor the strength of moral convictions 
about gender equality were expected to influence support for hostile forms of collective 
action. These predictions were investigated in Study 4.2.  
 
Study 4.2 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and fifty-one female undergraduate students from Leiden 
University (Mage = 20.30, SD = 2.28) participated for €3.50 or course credit. They were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a one-factor (regulatory focus: promotion or 
prevention) between-participants experiment. The strength of participants’ moral 
convictions about gender equality and the strength of their moral objections to hostile 
forms of collective action were measured as independent variables. As in Study 4.1, 
support for benevolent (behavioural) and hostile forms of collective action served as the 
dependent variables.15 
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Procedure 
We used the same procedure as in Study 4.1, with two differences. First, we 
manipulated (instead of measured) participants’ regulatory focus. Second, we included a 
measure of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action. We manipulated 
regulatory focus with an adapted version of the procedure suggested by Higgins and 
colleagues (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Zaal et al., in press, a). Prior to 
being presented with the other materials, participants wrote about what they would 
ideally like to (promotion condition) or felt they ought to (prevention condition) achieve 
in their working life. According to Higgins and colleagues (1994) the priming of ideals 
leads individuals to adopt a promotion focus, whereas the priming of oughts causes 
individuals to adopt a prevention focus. Participants then read the same research report 
about the discrimination of women in work situations as in Study 4,1. 
Measures 
All variables were measured on 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 9 (completely agree) unless otherwise reported. The correlations between 
the measures are included in Table 4.2. 
The importance of countering gender inequality was measured with three items 
(e.g. “Countering gender discrimination is very important to me”, α = .85). 
The strength of moral conviction about the gender equality was measured with 
five items (e.g. “Equality between men and women is part of the core of my moral 
convictions”, α = .72). 14 
Moral objections to hostile forms of collective action were measured with four 
items (e.g. “Harming the interests of organizations that discriminate is morally 
objectionable”, α = .63). 
To measure support for benevolent collective action, we gave participants the 
option to sign a petition calling for measures against gender discrimination within 
organizations.  
Support for hostile forms of collective action was measured by asking 
participants to report the extent to which they supported five different forms of hostile 
action (e.g. “Committing sabotage at discriminating organizations”, α = .71).  
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Table 4.2. Correlations between measures (Study 4.2) 
   2. 3. 4. 5.
  
1. Moral conviction about gender equality    .43*** -.03. 27*** .23** 
2. Importance of countering gender inequality   -.16 .21* .17* 
3. Moral objections to hostile collective action    -.17* -.04 
4. Support for hostile collective action       .20* 
5. Signed the petition (benevolent collective action)     
  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
To check whether or not the manipulation of regulatory focus was successful, 
seven judges, who were blind to condition, independently rated the focus of the 
paragraphs that the participants wrote as -1 (prevention-oriented), 0 (unclear), or +1 
(promotion-oriented). The judgments showed a very high degree of consistency (α = 
.94) and were thus collapsed into a single bipolar variable which reflects the mean 
judgment of the coders. High scores on this variable indicate promotion-oriented 
paragraphs, low scores prevention-oriented paragraphs. Analysis of variance showed 
that the essays of participants in the promotion condition, M = .75, SD = .31, were 
coded as significantly more promotion focused (and thus also as less prevention 
focused) than those of participants in the prevention condition, M = -.57, SD = .59, F(1, 
149) = 301.60, p < .001, η2 = .67. We therefore concluded that the manipulation of 
regulatory focus was successful.  
 
Benevolent Collective Action 
Benevolent collective action (signing the petition) was analyzed using logistic 
regression. Ninety-six participants (out of a total of 151) signed the petition (64%). The 
effect-coded manipulation of regulatory focus (-1 for the prevention condition, 1 for the 
promotion condition), the standardized moral conviction scale and their interaction term 
were entered into the analysis. To rule out the possibility that the importance of 
By any means necessary 
 
 
90 
countering gender inequality - instead of the strength of participants’ moral conviction 
about gender equality - could be responsible for the effects, we entered into the analysis 
this variable and its interaction with the manipulation of regulatory focus (see Yzerbyt, 
Muller & Judd, 2004).16 The results revealed the predicted interaction between the 
strength of participants’ moral conviction about gender equality and the manipulation of 
regulatory focus, Hypothesis 1, B = -.52, SE = .23, χ2 (1) = 5.20, p = .02, see Figure 4.3. 
As anticipated, moral conviction increased the odds of signing the petition among 
participants in the prevention condition, B = 1.08, SE = .38, χ2 (1) = 8.22, p = .004, but 
not among participants in the promotion condition, B = .05, SE = .25, χ2 (1) = 0.04, p = 
.84. No other effects reached significance, p’s > .22.17  
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Figure 4.3. The predicted probability of signing the petition as a function of the strength 
of the moral conviction about gender equality in the promotion and prevention 
conditions (Study 4.2). 
 
Support for Hostile Forms of Collective Action 
Support for hostile forms of collective action was analyzed using regression 
analysis. The effect-coded manipulation, the standardized moral conviction and moral 
objection scales, as well as their two- and three-way interaction terms were entered into 
the analysis as independent variables. We entered the standardized measure of the 
importance of countering gender inequality and its two- and three-way interactions with 
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the manipulation of regulatory focus and the strength of moral objection measure into 
the analysis as covariates.18 
The results revealed a three-way interaction between the manipulation of regulatory 
focus, the strength of moral conviction about gender equality and the strength of moral 
objections to hostile forms of collective action on the support for these forms of action, 
B = -.25, SE = .11, F(1, 139) = 5.07, p = .03, ∆R2 = .03. To break down this interaction, 
we performed two additional regression analyses: one for the promotion condition and 
one for the prevention condition. In both of these analyses, we entered the strength of 
moral conviction about gender equality, the strength of moral objections to hostile 
forms of collective action, and their interaction term into the analysis while controlling 
for the effect of the perceived importance of countering gender inequality and its 
interaction with the strength of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action. 
The results revealed the predicted interaction in the prevention condition between the 
strength of moral conviction about gender equality and the strength of moral objections 
to hostile forms of collective action on the support for these forms of action, B = .47, SE 
= .16, F(1, 64) = 8.57, p = .005, ∆R2 = .08, see Figure 4.4.  
 
Prevention condition
1
2
3
4
5
Weak Strong
Moral objections
Su
pp
o
rt
 
fo
r 
ho
st
ile
 
fo
rm
s 
o
f c
o
lle
ct
iv
e 
ac
tio
n
Weak moral
conviction
Strong moral
conviction
 
Figure 4.4. Support for hostile forms of collective action as a function of the strength of 
moral objections to these forms of action and the strength of moral conviction about 
gender equality in the prevention condition (Study 4.2). 
 
Simple slope analyses showed that in the prevention condition, moral objections 
to hostile forms collective action only decreased support for these forms of action 
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among individuals with weak moral conviction about gender equality, B = -1.01, SE = 
.25, F(1, 64) = 16.81, p < .001. As hypothesized, moral objections to hostile forms of 
collective action did not affect support for these forms of action among individuals with 
a strong moral conviction about gender equality, B = -.08, SE = .21, F < 1. In the 
promotion condition, support for hostile forms of collective action was influenced 
neither by the strength of moral conviction about gender equality, nor by the strength of 
moral objections to hostile forms of collective action, nor by their interaction (all F’s < 
1). Importantly, neither the perceived importance of countering gender inequality, nor 
any of its interactions with the manipulation of regulatory focus and/or with the strength 
of moral objections to hostile forms of collective action were significantly related to the 
support for these forms of collective action, all F’s < 1.87, p’s > .17. Thus, the results 
reported above cannot be attributed to differences in the perceived importance of 
countering gender inequality. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 4.2 provide additional evidence for the prediction that 
support for hostile and benevolent forms of collective action in response to social 
discrimination can best be seen as a prevention-oriented responses to perceived 
immorality. As predicted, holding a strong moral conviction about gender equality was 
shown to cause individuals under prevention focus to support benevolent as well as 
hostile forms of collective action, even when they perceived hostile forms of collective 
action as immoral. Among individuals under promotion focus, neither holding a strong 
moral conviction about gender equality, nor holding moral objections to hostile forms of 
collective action affected support for either benevolent or hostile forms of collective 
action. These findings are in line with our argument that the ends justify the means for 
prevention-oriented individuals with a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment 
of their group. 
Study 4.2 thus extends the results of Study 4.1 by showing that the different 
responses of promotion and prevention-oriented individuals can be obtained using a 
manipulation of regulatory focus instead of a measure. In addition, we were able to rule 
out the possibility that it is the importance of countering gender inequality rather than 
the moral conviction with which this goal is held that causes the observed effects. 
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Moreover, this second study extends the results of the previous study by taking into 
account the strength of participants’ moral objections to hostile forms of collective 
action.  
 
General Discussion 
 
The current studies were designed to investigate the effects of regulatory focus 
on the way moral considerations motivate hostile and benevolent forms of collective 
action. Previous research has already shown that moral convictions can motivate people 
to engage in benevolent forms collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, in 
press). With the current studies, we build on and extend these findings by demonstrating 
that moral considerations also motivate hostile forms of collective action and by 
elucidating why this is the case. We argued that because moral considerations function 
as “oughts” (i.e. goals of which non-achievement is seen as more negative than 
achievement is seen as positive; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989), they should 
affect behaviour through the prevention self-regulatory system. Furthermore, because a 
prevention focus involves construing strong goals (such as those mandated by moral 
conviction) as necessities (Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010; Shah & 
Higgins, 1997; Zaal et al., in press, a), we argued that the effects of holding a strong 
moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group should cause the prevention-
oriented to perceive any means to be justified in order to reach the necessary goal. Thus, 
we predicted that prevention-oriented individuals (but not promotion-oriented 
individuals) who hold a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group 
would be willing to support hostile forms of collective action, even when they 
themselves would consider these forms of action immoral.  
We examined these predictions in two studies. As predicted, the results of both 
studies showed that moral convictions motivate both hostile and benevolent forms of 
collective action through the prevention self-regulatory system. When the prevention 
system was chronically active (Study 4.1) or experimentally activated (Study 4.2), 
holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group increased 
support for hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. By contrast, when the 
prevention system was chronically inactive (Study 4.1) or when a promotion focus was 
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induced (Study 4.2), holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the 
group had no effect on support for either form of action. In addition, and as predicted, 
Study 4.2 showed that for prevention-oriented individuals holding a strong moral 
conviction about the fair treatment of the group overrides moral objections to hostile 
forms of collective action. More specifically, prevention-oriented individuals with a 
strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group supported hostile forms 
of collective action even when they perceived these forms as being immoral. Thus, for 
them the ends appeared to justify the means. 
 
Implications 
The present work provides a deeper understanding of individuals’ willingness to 
engage in hostile forms of collective action. The results of the studies reported in this 
contribution suggest that violent, hostile forms of collective action may be better 
understood as prevention-oriented responses to what is perceived as immoral treatment 
of the ingroup. Prevention-oriented individuals construe strong goals (such as those 
mandated by moral conviction) as necessities, which causes them to become insensitive 
to objections to the way these goals are pursued. When prevention-oriented individuals 
come to believe that their group is treated in an immoral way, they become highly 
motivated to rectify this situation. Because under prevention focus strong motivation is 
experienced as necessity (instead of as “desire” for individuals under promotion focus) 
prevention-oriented individuals become insensitive to moral objections to the way group 
status improvement is pursued, paving the way for the occurrence of hostile forms of 
collective action such as terrorism (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Skitka & Mullen, 
2002). 
On a practical level, the results of the present work show that there may be risks 
associated with using moral arguments to promote collective action. More precisely, 
because moral considerations affect behaviour through the prevention system, those 
swayed by moral argumentation will come to see the collective goal more as a necessity 
than as a desire, paving the way for the use of hostile means in pursuit of this goal. 
Activists who use moral argumentation to mobilize others for their cause may thus 
inadvertently create the conditions that facilitate the occurrence of hostile forms of 
collective action. Alternatively, activists could consider framing their moral message in 
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terms fitting a promotion focus (i.e. by presenting it as representing a maximal goal, 
[Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009]). This should cause those mobilized to see the 
goal of collective action less as a necessity, thereby decreasing the likelihood that 
hostile forms of collective action will be undertaken. However, this approach may have 
drawbacks of its own. Because goal commitment under promotion focus depends 
heavily on expectations of success (Shah & Higgins, 1997), trying to motivate collective 
action through reframing its moral goal in promotion-oriented terms should only be 
effective when the likelihood that collective action will succeed is high (Zaal et al., in 
press, a), a precondition that is rarely met (Hornsey et al., 2006). 
Applying regulatory focus theory to the study of the motivation to engage in 
collective action appears to be a fruitful endeavour on a broader theoretical level as 
well. In recent years, the collective action literature has benefited greatly from work 
investigating the relative strength of different motivators (e.g. instrumentality, 
perceptions of injustice and different forms of social identification) on commitment to 
collective action (e.g. Kelly, 1993; Stürmer & Simon, 2005; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008). A logical next step would be to investigate the situations under which, 
and the individuals for whom, some factors form stronger motivators of collective 
action than others, or have different effects on some than on others. Understanding the 
self-regulatory processes underlying the motivation to engage in collective action 
promises to be especially important in this next theoretical step. For example, in our 
own work (Zaal et al., in press, a) we have shown that the distinction between 
promotion and prevention focus helps to understand how instrumental motives affect 
the decision to engage in collective action. More precisely, this work has shown that 
instrumental considerations (i.e. those relating to the expectation that collective action 
will succeed or not) only motivate promotion-oriented (and not prevention-oriented) 
individuals to engage in collective action, providing an explanation for inconsistent 
support for the role of instrumental considerations in the motivation to engage in 
collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). The present work complements these 
findings by showing that perceptions of injustice and immorality motivate prevention-
oriented (and not promotion-oriented) individuals to engage in collective action (see 
also Sassenberg & Hansen, 2007). Together, these strands of research show how 
regulatory focus nicely fits into the perspective proposed by Van Zomeren and 
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colleagues (2004) in which perceptions of injustice and instrumental considerations are 
held to form two separate motivational paths to engagement in collective action. 
In this research we investigated individuals’ support for hostile forms of 
collective action on behalf of their group. This does not necessarily imply that our 
results generalize to personal engagement in hostile forms of collective action. Actively 
engaging in (vs. passively supporting) hostile forms of collective action may involve 
additional risk. Previous research has suggested that a prevention focus involves an 
aversion towards risk (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Because of this risk aversion, it could 
be that prevention-oriented individuals personally refrain from engaging in hostile 
forms of collective action, even if they support them. While this may seem plausible, 
recent work has shown that prevention-oriented individuals are not always risk averse 
(Scholer, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2008; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 
2010). More specifically, prevention-oriented individuals, when pursuing goals they 
deem necessities, are willing to take risks if taking risks is the only way to reach their 
goal. If, as we claim, prevention-oriented individuals construe the goal of collective 
action as a necessity when they hold this goal with moral conviction, then they should 
be willing to personally engage in hostile (risky) forms of collective action when 
benevolent (safe) avenues towards social change are closed. Importantly, research has 
found hostile forms of collective action to occur precisely in these situations (Gurr, 
1993; Louis et al., 2011; Spears, Scheepers, & Van Zomeren, 2011; Tausch, Becker, 
Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh, & Siddiqui, in press). Thus, because they see social change 
as a necessity, prevention-oriented individuals with a strong moral conviction about the 
fair treatment of their group should be especially likely to actually engage in hostile 
forms of collective action in these situations.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results of two studies demonstrated that regulatory focus 
affects the extent to which holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of 
their group leads individuals to become willing to support both hostile and benevolent 
forms of collective action. Holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of 
the group motivated individuals under prevention focus, but not individuals under 
promotion focus, to engage in benevolent collective action. Furthermore, prevention 
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(but not promotion) oriented individuals holding a strong moral conviction about the 
fair treatment of their group were also willing to support more extreme, hostile forms of 
collective action. This was even the case when these same individuals viewed these 
hostile forms of collective action as inherently immoral. Thus for prevention-oriented 
individuals the ends (social change) appeared to justify the means (hostile forms of 
collective action). 
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Footnotes 
11
 This chapter is based on Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, and Derks (in press, 
b) 
 
12
 Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the promotion and prevention 
scales could be empirically distinguished. The proposed two-factor structure fit better 
than the one-factor structure (∆χ2 = 211, ∆df = 1, p < .001). 
13
 Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the support for hostile and 
benevolent collective action scales could be empirically distinguished. The proposed 
two-factor structure fit better than the one-factor structure (∆χ2 = 168, ∆df = 1, p < 
.001). 
14
 Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the scales measuring the moral 
conviction of gender equality and the importance of countering gender inequality could 
be empirically distinguished. The proposed two-factor structure fit better than the one-
factor structure (∆χ2 = 60, ∆df = 1, p < .001). 
15
 Because of methodological difficulties associated with assessing personal 
engagement in actual hostile forms of collective action under controlled circumstances, 
we could not measure this as a behavioural variable. 
16
 Not including the importance of countering gender inequality and its 
interaction with regulatory focus does not substantially alter the results (focus x moral 
conviction interaction, p = .007). 
17
 Benevolent collective action was unrelated to moral objections to hostile 
forms of collective action (r(151) = .04, p = .66) and to any of its interactions with the 
other independent variables (p > .79), attesting to the fact that signing the petition was 
not seen as hostile. The interaction between the manipulation of regulatory focus and 
moral conviction on the odds of signing the petition was not further qualified by moral 
objections to hostile forms of collective action (three-way interaction p = .93).  
18
 Not including the importance of countering gender inequality and its 
interactions with the manipulation of regulatory focus and the measure of moral 
objections to hostile forms of collective action makes the hypothesized three-way 
interaction marginally significant (p = .08). However, in the prevention condition the 
predicted interaction between the measures of moral conviction and moral objections to 
By any means necessary 
 
 
99 
hostile forms of collective action is still significant (p = .01) and the separate lines 
consistent with predictions. 
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Samenvatting 
2011 was het jaar van het collectieve protest. Tijdens de Arabische lente 
kwamen de inwoners van verschillende landen in de Arabische wereld (Tunesië, 
Egypte, Libië, Syrië, Bahrein, Jemen) in opstand tegen de dictatoriale regimes in die 
landen. Nederlandse studenten protesteerden tegen bezuinigingen in het universitair 
onderwijs, scholieren protesteerden tegen de “ophokplicht” in het middelbaar onderwijs, 
Britten uit de lagere sociale klassen trokken gezamenlijk de straat op om te plunderen en 
een wereldwijde “Occupy” beweging werd gevormd om te protesteren tegen de 
oneerlijke verdeling van welvaart. Wat bezielt mensen die aan deze vormen van protest 
deelnemen? Snappen ze niet dat het protest eigenlijk net zo veel kans van slagen heeft 
zonder hen als met hen, en dat het dus eigenlijk logischer is om niet protesteren en om 
anderen het vuile werk op te laten knappen? Snappen ze niet dat protesteren toch 
eigenlijk weinig zin heeft? Of protesteren ze omdat ze geloven dat ze samen juist wél 
kans hebben op succes? En wat bezielt extremisten die naar geweld en wapens grijpen 
om hun doelen te bereiken? In dit proefschrift ga ik op zoek naar antwoorden op deze 
vragen.  
De mensen die deel uitmaakten van het protest in de bovenstaande voorbeelden 
hebben verschillende zaken met elkaar gemeen. Ten eerste delen ze het idee dat hun 
groep (bestaande uit bijvoorbeeld studenten of Tunesiërs), en daarom ook zij 
persoonlijk, op een onrechtvaardige manier benadeeld worden door anderen. Ten 
tweede hebben zij ervoor gekozen om samen te werken met andere mensen die in 
hetzelfde schuitje zitten om het behalen van hun gemeenschappelijke doelen mogelijk te 
maken. In de sociaal psychologische en sociologische literatuur wordt dit verschijnsel 
waarbij mensen handelen om de belangen van hun groep te behartigen collectieve actie 
genoemd. Omdat collectieve actie vaak de enige manier is om maatschappelijke doelen 
te bereiken, en gepaard kan gaan met hoge maatschappelijke kosten (bijvoorbeeld 
wanneer een vreedzame actie uit de hand loopt, of tijdens een gewelddadig protest) is 
het belangrijk te weten hoe mensen gemotiveerd raken om over te gaan tot collectieve 
actie en hoe ze vervolgens kiezen om deel te nemen aan vreedzame of gewelddadige 
vormen van actie. In dit proefschrift doe ik een poging antwoord te geven op deze 
vragen vanuit het perspectief van de regulatiefocus theorie (1997), een theorie die twee 
verschillende vormen van motivatie beschrijft, ten eerste de motivatie om doelen te 
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behalen die men graag wil behalen (promotiefocus) en ten tweede de motivatie om 
doelen te behalen waarvan men vindt dat die behaald moeten worden (preventiefocus). 
Voor ik deze theorie introduceer en uitleg hoe deze ons begrip van collectieve actie kan 
vergroten is het nodig om wat achtergrondinformatie te geven over de keuzes die 
mensen moeten maken wanneer ze met collectieve benadeling te maken krijgen.  
 
Reacties op collectieve benadeling 
Volgens Wright en collega’s (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a; 1990b, 
Wright, 2001) krijgen mensen die benadeeld worden op basis van hun 
groepslidmaatschap te maken met drie keuzes, en is hun reactie op deze benadeling 
afhankelijk van de uitkomsten van deze keuzes. Ten eerste moeten leden van 
benadeelde groepen kiezen tussen het nastreven van verbetering van hun eigen positie 
(individuele actie) en het nastreven van verbetering van de positie van de gehele 
benadeelde groep waarvan ze lid zijn (collectieve actie). Leden van structureel 
benadeelde groepen in de samenleving (zoals leden van etnische minderheden) kunnen 
hun eigen maatschappelijke positie bijvoorbeeld verbeteren door een opleiding te 
volgen, of vooruit te komen in hun werk. De straat op gaan om te demonstreren tegen 
discriminatie is een voorbeeld van gedrag dat gericht is op het verbeteren van de 
maatschappelijke positie van de gehele groep. Om te begrijpen waarom mensen ervoor 
kiezen om de straat op te gaan om te protesteren (in plaats van zich in te zetten voor 
bijvoorbeeld hun eigen carrière) moeten we dus allereerst weten hoe zij de keuze 
hebben gemaakt tussen het nastreven van hun persoonlijke doelen en het nastreven van 
de doelen van hun groep. 
Een tweede keuze die leden van benadeelde groepen moeten maken is te 
beslissen hoe toegewijd ze zijn aan het doel van collectieve of individuele 
statusverhoging dat ze hebben gekozen. Het deelnemen aan sommige vormen van 
collectieve actie (zoals het in hongerstaking gaan) vereist bijvoorbeeld een hogere mate 
van toewijding dan het deelnemen aan andere vormen van collectieve actie (zoals het 
tekenen van een petitie). Om te begrijpen waarom sommige mensen in hongerstaking 
gaan om de belangen van hun groep te dienen terwijl anderen slechts een petitie tekenen 
om hetzelfde doel te bereiken moeten we dus weten welke factoren bepalen hoe 
toegewijd mensen zijn aan het collectieve doel. 
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Ten derde gaan sommige vormen van collectieve actie (zoals gewelddadig 
protest) gepaard met het schaden van de belangen van degenen die gezien worden als 
verantwoordelijk voor de benadeelde positie van de groep, terwijl dat niet voor andere 
vormen geldt (zoals vreedzaam protest). Leden van benadeelde groepen moeten voor 
zichzelf beslissen in hoeverre ze het schaden van deze anderen gerechtvaardigd vinden 
in hun streven naar positieverbetering van hun groep.  
Dus, om te begrijpen hoe en waarom mensen in actie komen om de belangen 
van hun groep te behartigen moeten we weten 1) of ze ervoor gekozen hebben om 
groepsdoelen na te streven in plaats van individuele doelen, 2) hoe toegewijd ze zijn aan 
deze groepsdoelen, en 3) in welke mate ze vinden dat het schaden van de belangen van 
degenen die zij verantwoordelijk houden voor de benadeelde positie van de groep 
gerechtvaardigd is. Hieronder zal ik deze vragen proberen te beantwoorden vanuit het 
perspectief van de regulatiefocus theorie. Ik zal beargumenteren dat mensen in een 
preventiefocus (in tegenstelling tot mensen in een promotiefocus) 1) zich minder 
gemakkelijk laten verleiden tot individuele actie ten koste van collectieve actie. 
Wanneer ze het doel van collectieve actie als belangrijk zien zullen mensen in een 
preventiefocus 2) meer toegewijd zijn aan de actie ongeacht de kans van slagen die ze 
de actie toedichten, en 3) extremere vormen van collectieve actie niet schuwen. Om te 
kunnen begrijpen waarom dit zo is, zal ik eerst een overzicht van de regulatiefocus 
theorie geven. 
 
De regulatiefocus theorie 
 Volgens de regulatiefocus theorie van Higgins (1997; 1998), beschikken mensen 
over twee verschillende motivationele systemen, promotiefocus en preventiefocus. Deze 
verschillen van elkaar in functie en leiden tot het nastreven van verschillende soorten 
doelen, tot het gebruik van verschillende strategieën bij het nastreven van doelen. Ze 
roepen ook verschillende emotionele reacties op succes en falen op, en zorgen ervoor 
dat sterke motivatie op verschillende manieren wordt ervaren. Promotie- en 
preventiefocus variëren van moment tot moment, maar hebben ook een stabiele 
(chronische) component die wordt gevormd in de kindertijd (Higgins, Friedman, 
Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001; Keller, 2008) 
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 De promotiefocus helpt mensen te voldoen aan de behoefte aan groei en 
ontwikkeling. Activering van de promotiefocus leidt tot gedrag dat is gericht op het 
behalen van maximale doelen (doelen waarvan het behalen als positiever wordt gezien 
dan het niet behalen als negatief). Als gevolg hiervan leidt de promotiefocus tot de 
strategische neiging om toenadering te zoeken tot doelen (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). 
Mensen die succes behalen in een promotiefocus ervaren gevoelens van blijdschap, 
falen geeft gevoelens van verdriet of teleurstelling (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 
1987). Motivatie binnen de promotiefocus wordt ervaren als verlangen om een 
aantrekkelijk doel te bereiken (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, 
& Higgins, 2010). 
 De preventiefocus daarentegen helpt mensen te voldoen aan de behoefte aan 
veiligheid en zekerheid. Activering van de preventiefocus leidt tot het nastreven van 
minimale doelen (doelen waarvan het niet behalen als negatiever wordt gezien dan het 
behalen ervan als positief). Als gevolg hiervan leidt de preventiefocus tot de 
strategische neiging om alternatieven van doelen te vermijden (Crowe & Higgins, 
1997). In een preventiefocus roept succes gevoelens van rust op, terwijl falen gepaard 
met gevoelens van agitatie (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1987). Tot slot, en 
belangrijk voor deze samenvatting (en de rest van het proefschrift): een sterke motivatie 
binnen de preventiefocus wordt ervaren als noodzaak om het gestelde doel te bereiken 
(Shah & Higgins, 1997; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010).  
 
De keuze tussen individuele actie en collectieve actie 
Zoals eerder uitgelegd is het, om te begrijpen hoe en waarom mensen in opstand 
komen tegen de benadeelde positie van hun groep, belangrijk om te weten hoe zij 
kiezen tussen het nastreven van verbetering van hun persoonlijke positie en het 
nastreven van de positie van hun gehele groep. Eerder onderzoek heeft de mate waarin 
leden van benadeelde groepen gemakkelijk individueel succes kunnen behalen (de 
permeabiliteit van groepsgrenzen) geïdentificeerd als belangrijke voorspeller van de 
keuze tussen individuele en collectieve actie (Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 
1990). In situaties waarin er veel mogelijkheden zijn om individueel succes te behalen 
(men spreekt hier van een open sociaal systeem) kiezen leden van benadeelde groepen 
over het algemeen eerder voor individuele actie. In situaties waar weinig of geen kansen 
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op individueel succes bestaan (ook wel: een gesloten sociaal systeem) verkiezen zij 
eerder collectieve actie boven individuele actie. Vaak echter ligt de werkelijke mate van 
permeabiliteit tussen die van het open systeem en die van het gesloten systeem in. 
Leden van benadeelde groepen hebben in dergelijke situaties (men spreekt hier van een 
token systeem) in principe wel kansen op individueel maatschappelijk succes, maar 
deze kansen zijn beduidend kleiner dan die van leden van bevoordeelde groepen. 
(Wright, 1997; Richard & Wright, 2001). In deze gevallen is het voor leden van 
benadeelde groepen dus moeilijk om te bepalen wat de aangewezen strategie is 
(collectieve actie of individuele actie). Onderzoek van Wright (1997) laat zien dat leden 
van benadeelde groepen zich in dergelijke situaties vooral richten op individueel succes 
ten koste van gezamenlijke pogingen tot collectieve statusverhoging. Volgens Wright 
(1997; Richard & Wright, 2001) wordt de keuze voor individuele actie in deze situatie 
veroorzaakt doordat men zich richt op de positieve (meritocratische) aspecten van het 
systeem en minder aandacht besteedt aan de negatieve (discriminatoire) kanten van het 
systeem.  
In de twee studies die in hoofdstuk twee van dit proefschrift worden besproken 
heb ik onderzocht of (en hoe) hier wat aan veranderd zou kunnen worden. Het idee 
achter deze studies was als volgt. Als het probleem is dat mensen zich in hun handelen 
te veel op de positieve (meritocratische) aspecten van het token systeem richten, is dit 
wellicht indicatief voor een promotiefocus.  Promotiegerichte mensen handelen immers 
om positieve uitkomsten te benaderen. Het verleggen van hun motivationele oriëntatie 
naar de preventiefocus zou hun aandacht meer moeten richten op de negatieve 
(discriminatoire) aspecten van het systeem. Dit zou vervolgens moeten leiden tot meer 
steun voor collectieve actie tegen de negatieve aspecten van het systeem. In twee 
experimenten vonden we precies dat. Mensen met een (chronische of door ons 
geïnduceerde) promotiefocus richtten zich vooral op het verbeteren van hun 
persoonlijke positie. Ze waren minder gericht op het verbeteren van de positie van hun 
groep in token situaties dan in een controle conditie waarin geen individueel succes 
mogelijk was. Voor mensen met een (chronische of geïnduceerde) preventiefocus bleek 
dit niet het geval. Zij waren vooral gericht op het verbeteren van de positie van hun 
groep. Het maakte in dit geval niet uit of ze de mogelijkheid kregen hun individuele 
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positie te verbeteren (zoals in de token conditie) of niet (zoals in de gesloten controle 
conditie). 
 
Toewijding aan collectieve actie 
 In de psychologische literatuur wordt aangenomen dat je de mate van toewijding 
aan een doel kunt berekenen. Dit is mogelijk door de subjectieve waarde van het doel te 
corrigeren voor de kans dat dit doel behaald zal worden (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). De 
redenering is dat men bereid is om tijd en energie te steken in het nastreven van doelen 
waaraan men belang hecht, maar alleen voor zover er een goede kans bestaat deze 
doelen te behalen. In de collectieve actie literatuur spreekt men in dit verband van het 
collectieve motief. Men neemt deel aan collectieve actie omdat men waarde hecht aan 
het verbeteren van de positie van de groep én denkt dat dit doel bereikt kan worden door 
samenwerking met andere leden van de groep (cf. Klandermans, 1984a). Onderzoek 
naar actiebereidheid onder activisten laat echter zien dat dit “collectieve motief” niet in 
alle gevallen een goede voorspeller vormt voor deelname aan collectieve actie (cf. 
Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jorger, 2003). Dit betekent dat in sommige gevallen mensen 
bereid zijn om zich toe te wijden aan collectieve actie, zelfs wanneer ze weinig 
vertrouwen hebben in de goede afloop ervan.  
In hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift worden drie onderzoeken besproken die 
ingaan op deze kwestie. In deze onderzoeken wordt de invloed van regulatiefocus  
onderzocht op de mate waarin instrumentele overwegingen mensen motiveren tot 
collectieve actie over te gaan. Het uitgangspunt was dat individuele regulatiefocus 
bepaalt hoe men sterke motivatie ervaart: als verlangen (bij een promotiefocus) of als 
verplichting (bij een preventiefocus). Promotiegerichte mensen zien voor hen 
belangrijke doelen als verlangens, preventiegerichte mensen zien voor hen belangrijke 
doelen als noodzakelijkheden (cf. Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). 
Wanneer men waarde hecht aan het doel van collectieve actie, betekent dit dat 
promotiegerichte mensen dit als verlangen zouden moeten ervaren terwijl 
preventiegerichte mensen het behalen ervan als noodzaak zouden moeten zien. 
Noodzakelijke doelen zijn doelen die behaald moeten worden, zelfs als de kans op 
succes gering is. Daarom werd verwacht dat preventiegerichte mensen die veel waarde 
hechten aan het doel van collectieve actie (en het behalen van dit doel dus als een 
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noodzaak zien) bereid zouden zijn deze actie te steunen, ongeacht de succeskans ervan. 
Van promotiegerichte mensen die veel waarde hechten aan het doel van collectieve actie 
werd daarentegen verwacht dat ze dit doel vooral als een verlangen zouden zien. Met 
deze visie op collectieve positieverbetering is het verstandig te wachten op goede 
kansen om dit doel te bereiken. De resultaten van drie onderzoeken waren in 
overeenstemming met deze voorspellingen. Promotiegerichte mensen bleken vooral 
toegewijd aan collectieve actie wanneer ze zowel veel waarde aan het doel hechtten als 
een hoge succesverwachting koesterden. Preventiegerichte mensen bleken toegewijd 
wanneer ze waarde hechtten aan het doel, ongeacht de verwachting dat het collectieve 
doel behaald zou kunnen. Dit was het geval wanneer we mensen vergeleken die 
chronisch verschillen in promotie- en preventiegerichtheid, maar ook wanneer we met 
instructies tijdens het onderzoek promotie- of preventiegerichtheid induceerden.   
 
 
De keuze tussen vreedzame en gewelddadige vormen van actie  
Zoals eerder uitgelegd zijn sommige vormen van collectieve actie (zoals rellen 
en sabotage) gericht op het schaden van de belangen van de mensen of groepen die als 
verantwoordelijk voor de benadeelde positie van de groep worden gezien. Om te 
begrijpen hoe mensen ertoe komen deel te nemen aan dergelijke extremere vormen van 
actie is het belangrijk om te begrijpen in welke situaties zij deze vormen van actie als 
gerechtvaardigd zien.  
In hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift worden twee onderzoeken besproken die erop 
gericht waren deze vraag te beantwoorden. Net als in hoofdstuk 3 waren de 
voorspellingen gebaseerd op de bevinding dat mensen in een preventiefocus sterke 
motivatie anders ervaren (nl. als noodzaak) dan mensen in een promotiefocus (die sterke 
motivatie ervaren als verlangen). Het idee was dat mensen die het behalen van een doel 
als noodzakelijkheid zien het gebruik van extremere methoden om dit doel te behalen 
gerechtvaardigd vinden. Dit geldt niet wanneer het doel als een verlangen wordt gezien. 
Immers, wanneer het behalen van een doel als noodzakelijk wordt gezien, dan maakt het 
niet uit hoe dit doel bereikt wordt, zolang het maar bereikt wordt. De voorspelling voor 
mensen in een preventiefocus was dus dat het belang dat ze aan het doel van collectieve 
actie hechten het gebruik van extremere, gewelddadigere vormen van collectieve actie 
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zou moeten rechtvaardigen. Dit zou niet het geval moeten zijn voor mensen in een 
promotiefocus. 
De resultaten van twee onderzoeken waren in overeenstemming met deze 
voorspellingen. Studie 4.1 liet zien dat alleen voor mensen in een preventiefocus, het 
belang dat zij hechten aan het collectieve doel ervoor zorgt dat extremere vormen van 
collectieve actie als gerechtvaardigd worden gezien. De resultaten van Studie 4.2 lieten 
zien dat dit zelfs geldt wanneer mensen sterke morele bezwaren ervaren tegen het 
gebruik van deze extremere vormen van actie. Het ervaren van morele bezwaren tegen 
extremere vormen van collectieve actie weerhield mensen in een preventiefocus ervan  
dergelijke vormen van actie te steunen, maar alleen zolang zij geen sterk belang 
hechtten aan het doel van de actie. Mensen in een preventiefocus die veel belang 
hechtten aan het doel van collectieve actie (en het behalen van dit doel dus als een 
noodzakelijkheid zagen) steunden deze extremere vormen van actie, zelfs wanneer zij 
deze vormen normaal gesproken immoreel zouden vinden. Voor hen heiligt het doel dus 
de middelen.  
 
Conclusie 
Samengevat laten de resultaten van de zeven in dit proefschrift gerapporteerde 
onderzoeken zien dat de preventiefocus de meest geschikte motivationele oriëntatie is 
voor het bevorderen van deelname aan collectieve actie. Mensen in een preventiefocus 
bleken - meer dan mensen in een promotiefocus - collectieve actie te verkiezen boven 
individuele actie, zelfs wanneer individuele positieverbetering een reële mogelijkheid 
vormt. Wanneer ze voldoende waarde hechten aan het doel van collectieve 
positieverbetering, zijn mensen in een preventiefocus (maar niet mensen in een 
promotiefocus) bereid om deel te nemen aan collectieve actie, zelfs wanneer de 
succeskansen beperkt zijn, of de actievormen extremer zijn dan ze normaal gesproken 
acceptabel zouden vinden.  
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